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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the criticisms surrounding the use of terror sting operations by law 
enforcement agencies for the purpose of developing recommendations to increase public 
support, particularly among the American Muslim population. The relevant literature is 
replete with criticisms surrounding the behavior of civilian informants during terror sting 
operations and the effect those actions have on community relations. Critics claim that 
terror sting operations constitute spying, profiling, and entrapment. Contrary to that 
claim, however, is the fact that these operations have successfully withstood intense legal 
scrutiny; trials in which defendants are accused of carrying out these plots have always 
resulted in conviction. The goal of this thesis, therefore, is not to argue that the operations 
not be conducted, but rather to identify improvements that law enforcement agencies can 
implement to minimize the perception that terror sting operations are a form of 
entrapment or profiling. The results of this research are recommendations centered on 
addressing the most common or legitimate criticisms. The goal of these recommendations 
is to minimize the negative impact on community relations while simultaneously 
improving the quality of terror sting operations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research analyzes terror sting operations that involve the use of informants or 
undercover officers deployed into targeted locations by law enforcement agencies. Once 
deployed, the informants or undercover officers seek to identify and befriend potential 
terrorists, which ultimately afford them an opportunity to commit an act of terrorism that 
typically involves detonating an inert bomb at a target location. Those who take the bait, 
if you will, become the subjects of elaborately staged terrorist plots with law enforcement 
agents posing as co-conspirators. Once the subject commits the act, he is arrested, 
ultimately charged in federal court, and typically sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 
These operations have been extremely successful and receive praise from the law 
enforcement community and the general public to some degree; however, Muslim critics, 
the media, and civil rights groups have become increasingly critical of the practice and 
have painted a picture of sinister government abuse. The negative light in which these 
practices are increasingly cast has arguably set back years of community policing 
progress in Muslim communities. Critics claim that the practice of conducting terror sting 
operations, which often involves sending undercover officers or informants into 
MOSQUES or other Muslim establishments, amounts to spying, entrapment, and 
profiling. Recently, relations between the Muslim community and the NYPD have been 
strained as televised protests and demonstrations have become increasingly common.1 In  
 
 
                                                 
1 See the following sources: CBS New York, “Fallout Continues From NYPD Muslim Student Group 
Monitoring,” March 3, 2012, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/03/03/nj-officials-meeting-with-muslim-
community-on-nypd-program/; Eileen Sullivan and Chris Hawley, “New York Muslims Rally to Protest 
NYPD Surveillance Program,” Huffington Post, November 18, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/11/18/new-york-muslims-plan-ral_n_1101747.html; Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “Newark 
Muslims Hold Protest Rally over NYPD Spy Operation,” Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 2012, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0224/Newark-Muslims-hold-protest-rally-over-
NYPD-spy-operation; CBS New York, “Students Protest NYPD’s Surveillance Of Muslims, Call For 
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly’s Resignation,” March 3, 2012, http://newyork.cbslocal.com 
/2012/03/03/nj-officials-meeting-with-muslim-community-on-nypd-program/; Stephen Nessen, “WNYC 




addition, much inflammatory literature and media has been circulated online and in news 
sources, which has further incited Muslim opposition against American law enforcement 
agencies.  
This increasingly negative perception that many Muslims have of being spied 
upon and profiled may be strengthening the appeal of radical Islamists who seek to 
perpetuate the notion that Americans are the enemy of Islam. Of particular concern to 
critics of this practice is the use of informants, since they are often accused of being 
overly instrumental in the subject’s decision to commit an act of terror.  
The purpose of this research is not to judge the efficacy or legality of terror sting 
operations, since the legality of the practice has been well established, but rather to 
attempt to understand what the criticisms are and to attempt to address them through 
changes in policy. To that end, this thesis focuses on analyzing the terror sting operations 
that have generated significant controversy or that have been researched in academic 
publications that delineate specific criticisms against the operations. The selected cases 
and relevant publications are discussed in detail in the literature review and in  
Chapter III. 
At the conclusion of this thesis, several recommendations are presented that will 
serve to benefit law enforcement agencies as they attempt to balance counter-terrorism 
efforts with their mission to uphold the rights of the people they serve. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the methods law enforcement agencies employ in terror sting operations 
be enhanced to mitigate concerns from within the Muslim community pertaining to 
entrapment, spying, and profiling?  
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
Agent Provocateur:1 This term is frequently used to describe an increasingly 
popular counter-terrorism law enforcement tactic that has generated considerable 
controversy, particularly within the Muslim community, the press, and within civil 
liberties activist circles. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), law enforcement agencies, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and New York City Police 
Department (NYPD), have been introducing operatives who are either civilian informants 
or undercover officers into specific locations to apprehend terrorists by staging 
sophisticated terrorist plots. The tactic involves the use of confidential informants who 
report back to handling agencies with information concerning potential jihadists and who 
carry out instructions to bait the suspects into committing what they believe are real 
terrorist attacks. While the official number of incidents in which this tactic has been 
employed is not published, one source estimates that as many as 200 Muslim males have 
been arrested as a result of these types of sting operations since 9/11;2 another source 
indicates 138 terrorism prosecutions have involved informants since 2001.3  
Law enforcement agencies including the FBI and NYPD have been accused of 
profiling because of their practice of introducing informants into Muslim communities 
and their houses of worship. Law enforcement agencies have also been accused of 
                                                 
1 Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Agent Provocateur—Definition and More,” (n.d.), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agent%20provocateur. 
2 Smita Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United 
States (New York University, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011), 2. 
3 Petra Bartosiewicz, “Deploying Informants, the FBI Stings Muslims,” The Nation, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168380/deploying-informants-fbi-stings-muslims#%20. 
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maintaining lists and databases regarding locations and the identities of persons who 
frequent them without having any particular leads or suspicions there. Critics have 
claimed that this practice constitutes profiling and an infringement upon the 
constitutional rights of Muslims.4 They further characterize the practice of using 
informants and undercover officers to offer individuals terrorist opportunities as acts of 
entrapment that tend to lead to the incarceration of simple-minded “idiots” or 
incompetent individuals who would have remained harmless were it not for the active 
encouragement of law enforcement.5 Another criticism posits that, by staging scenarios 
that can amount to millions of dollars in costs, law enforcement officials are creating 
attacks that do not exist, and celebrating when they prevent them from occurring—the 
criticism being that such tactics can hardly be effective, or cost-effective counter-
terrorism tactics since no real threats actually existed. Stated otherwise, the criticism 
alleges that agencies are spending large amounts of money and devoting significant 
resources to apprehend individuals committing plots that never existed.  
The aspect of informant/ infiltration operations that seems to draw the greatest 
criticism throughout the literature is the behavior of informants. Instances have occurred 
in which informants are accused of manipulating the defendants to the point of getting 
them to commit the crimes over their repeated objections.6 In other cases, the informants 
are portrayed as being the masterminds of the terrorist operation, and serving as mentors 
to the weak-minded individuals who stand little chance of resisting them.  
The general use of informants by law enforcement agencies is a topic worthy of 
significant research on its own. According to some of the literature concerning 
informants, the practice of utilizing informants has even been said to be contributing to a 
significant change in the very sociological fabric itself of inner city neighborhoods.7 
                                                 
4 Muslim Advocates, “Losing Liberty: The State of Freedom 10 Years After the Patriot Act,” 
November 11, 2011, 12. 
5 Bruce Schneier, “Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot,” WIRED, June 14, 2007, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/06/securitymatters_0614. 
6 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 36. 
7 Alexandra Natapoff, “Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,” U. Cin. L. Rev. 73 
(2004). 
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Although the full argument contains many nuances, it can be summarized this way: 
Informants are almost always convicted criminals who, while being “employed” by the 
law enforcement agency, continue to engage in criminal conduct. In exchange for their 
work with the agencies, informants are granted benefits ranging from monetary 
compensation to criminal immunity. While law enforcement officials certainly reap 
rewards from the use of informants, these individuals are rewarded with a kind of state-
sponsored legitimacy that serves to promote their self-interests. A notable example within 
the literature is an individual who continued to deal drugs and carry a firearm while 
acting as an informant. He carefully chose which information to provide to his handler, 
which included the crimes that rival drug dealers, his girlfriend’s ex boyfriend, his 
landlord, and other individuals he had personal issues with committed. During his time as 
an informant, he was arrested, his handler was contacted, and the arresting officer 
released him as a courtesy, which provided the informant with an incredible amount of 
power and influence in the neighborhood in which he conducted his illicit activities. Not 
only was crime in the neighborhood inadvertently facilitated by local police who acted on 
his directions, but this situation also created a widespread sense of distrust that fueled 
violence and may have actually led to increased crime.  
This example is a microcosm of what may be transpiring in urban areas 
throughout the nation. Informants are used in almost all major investigations throughout 
American urban areas, and have the potential to influence their surroundings in a 
substantial manner if they are keen enough to manipulate the system to their benefit.  
Despite the negative implications of utilizing informants and the possibly 
significant sociological repercussions, their use has repeatedly been determined to be 
proper by juries as, according to one estimate, 92% of FBI informant cases resulted in 
conviction.8 According to some of the literature, particularly the ideological and political 
literature, this sentiment is certainly not baseless. The use of informants is described as a 
                                                 
8 Democracy Now! “Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants Raises 
Questions About Validity of Terrorism Cases,” October 6, 2010, http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance. 
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“…legally permissive, yet ethically repugnant activity” by one authority on the subject.9 
Indeed, police work, if it is to be effective against criminal activity, routinely requires 
that law enforcement officials employ methods that are not normally acceptable social 
behavior. The use of trickery and deceit by law enforcement has been repeatedly upheld 
by the Supreme Court that, through its decisions, has sanctioned the use of various 
deceptive techniques that have equipped law enforcement agencies with the tools they 
need to gain the upper hand against complex criminal organizations. Such tactics include 
sting operations that may involve elaborate schemes including false store fronts; fencing 
operations where goods are sold to persons who are informed that the goods are stolen 
and are subsequently arrested for the purchase; the use of bait vehicles that shut off or 
trap thieves inside vehicles once they are stolen; intentional lying or deceptive techniques 
used on suspects during questioning; and the use of surrogates, that is, other persons who 
are not law enforcement officials but rather are local criminals who serve to facilitate the 
deceptive operation; or the use of secreted equipment including microphones, video 
cameras, or other devices to gather required evidence secretly.10 
Regarding the use of terror sting operations, a persistent pattern of criticism seems 
to arise from many in the private sector on one hand, and a complete dismissal of the 
criticisms from the legal and professional field of the criticisms on the other. It is almost 
as though the legal authorities have concluded that since the entrapment defense has 
never amounted to a not-guilty verdict or a dismissal of charges, addressing the criticisms 
is unnecessary. Given the persistent public outcry from Muslim communities and civil 
rights groups, law enforcement may benefit from formulating changes in policy to at least 
address the perception of profiling or entrapment. Allegations of spying, infiltrating, 
entrapment, and profiling fill urban newspapers and may possibly be setting back years of 
community policing progress.  
                                                 
9 Dr. Thomas O’Connor, “Informants, Surveillance, and Other Sources of Information,” North 
Carolina Wesleyan College, 2004, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=447656, 1. 
10 Graeme R. Newman, Kelly Socia, and United States Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, Sting Operations: By Graeme R. Newman with the Assistance of Kelly Socia, 
Issue 6, Problem-oriented Guide for Police, Response Series (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2007), http://books.google.com/books?id=jya8tgAACAAJ. 
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No doubt exists that the proactive approach to homeland security that agencies 
like the NYPD and FBI have taken has served to prevent terrorist attacks since 9/11.11 
These sting operations may also have contributed, at least in part, to the strong reluctance 
of Muslim community leaders to allow extremist rhetoric inside their facilities. The cause 
for this disinclination may very well be the Muslim community’s general willingness to 
combat radicalization and terrorism in their communities in most cases; but it may also be 
the sense of police omnipresence having an effect in some instances as well. An 
interesting aspect of this relationship between the use of infiltrative techniques and the 
general perception of police omnipresence within Muslim circles is that perhaps these 
techniques are having an active silencing effect on those who would otherwise feel free to 
espouse radical beliefs in public. Since radicals have now been somewhat limited in their 
ability to express their radical views in Muslim circles due to the perception that law 
enforcement agents are everywhere, perhaps the spread of radicalization itself is being 
curtailed by this practice to some degree since the Muslim population, particularly the 
youth who are more susceptible, are less exposed to it.12 
Undeniable value exists in defeating the ideology behind the radical Islamists 
through the use of these terror sting operations. However, the research in this thesis is 
conducted based upon the belief that a legitimate need, and potential benefit to the law 
enforcement community does exist, to address the Muslim community’s perception of 
these operations as spying, profiling, and entrapment. Therefore, this research concerns 
itself with this complex problem by beginning with the assumption that these operations 
are constitutional, as none of the criticisms has resulted in even a single overturned case.  
Yet, how much more effective would these operations be on a sociological or 
criminological level if they were better supported by the Muslim community and if law 
enforcement agencies sufficiently addressed the general criticisms against their use? Do 
meaningful ways exist to increase public support for this practice, particularly within 
Muslim circles? 
                                                 
11 NYPD, “Terrorist Plots Targeting New York City,” (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/ 
pr/plots_targeting_nyc.shtml. 
12 Angela Gendron, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Trends in 
Terrorism Series 4 (2006): 9. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Three Classes of Relevant Literature 
The relevant literature for this research can be categorized into three classes. The 
most widely available, and perhaps the most valuable, the scholarly literature, which 
includes academic journals, reports, theses, think tank publications, and other documents, 
provides analyses of both individual cases and of the larger theoretical implications and 
aspects of terror sting operations. This class of literature represents the core of 
substantive material most relevant to the research.  
The next class of literature reviewed is informational, which is comprised of news 
reports, government press releases, court transcripts, and other publicly released 
statements and narratives surrounding the capture of individuals apprehended during 
sting operations. This type of literature offers relatively straightforward, summary 
accounts of each of the instances in which plots were disrupted based upon court 
testimony, statements released by law enforcement officials, or interviews obtained by 
the press. This class of literature proved to be very useful in the preparation for this 
research since the vast majority of subject matter on the issue at hand is riddled with 
opinion and judgments regarding the morality or ethics of using informants or trickery to 
apprehend individuals with carefully orchestrated plots. Therefore, when considering the 
validity of certain arguments, it was useful to be able to extract the core evidence from 
each case within court transcripts or reports and measure the usefulness of the argument 
being made according to the facts presented. In fact, it is doubtful that it is possible to 
make an informed judgment on whether or not the tactic is fair, justified, or otherwise 
appropriate without carefully reviewing the facts as they were recorded during official 
testimony by the affected parties. 
The final type of literature applicable to this research is opinion-based, which is 
comprised of editorials, newspaper articles, blogs, web sites, and other sources that 
almost unanimously criticize this practice. Indeed, it was difficult to locate any literature 
of this kind that held a supporting viewpoint for terror sting operations. The volume of 
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critical literature is so large, in fact, that it was difficult to weed out the legitimate 
research or policy works from rants and non-factual accounts.  
a. Academics/Professional 
For the purposes of this research the academic/professional class of 
literature can be divided into three subcategories: academic journals/publications, 
government journals/publications, and private organizations/think tank publications.  
(1) Academic Journals/Publications. In considering the 
questions evaluating contrived government plots with the use of informants, and the 
subsequent effectiveness, morality, or legality of such tactics, a variety of academic 
publications proved to be useful. Many academic institutions have made well-researched 
contributions to this topic including New York University, University of Wisconsin, 
North Carolina Wesleyan College, University of Chicago, and the University of 
Cincinnati, all of which have published legal journals that have hosted some discourse on 
this topic. The journals produced by these institutions differ in their conclusions 
regarding the use of informants and deceptive plots that may contribute to entrapment, or 
at least the perception of it; however, regardless of the position or conclusions regarding 
such practices, they almost unanimously indicate that negative consequences resulted 
from using these tactics—some being community outrage, setbacks in delicate 
relationships with the Muslim community, political pressure hindering counter-terrorism 
progress, and the reliance on the contributions of informants who are almost always men 
of questionable integrity from the outset.  
Some of the more useful components of this class of literature are 
the in-depth analyses regarding some of the core issues behind the deceptive practices. 
Memphis State University’s Law and Philosophy journal serves as a good example as it 
closely examines the entrapment defense and the ethical issues and consequences of law 
enforcement’s continued use of infiltrative methods.13 Another example of academic 
literature that proved to be relevant is the journal Crime, Law, and Social Change, which 
                                                 
13 B. Grant Stitt and Gene G. James, “Entrapment and the Entrapment Defense: Dilemmas for a 
Democratic Society,” Law and Philosophy 3, no. 1 (1984): 111–131. 
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confronts the general ethical questions regarding the necessity of the use of deception in 
law enforcement, and further delves into the dangers of treading the fine line between 
entrapment and effective law enforcement practices.14 Some of the literature provides in-
depth analyses of some of the infamous court cases revolving around the issues of 
entrapment and informants including the 1992 case of Jacobson v. United States—a rare 
victory on the side of the defendant, which ultimately revived the entrapment defense for 
use in subsequent proceedings. 
Academic publications are without a doubt where the vast majority 
of substance for this research lies; as their strength is not only in their generally vigorous 
and meticulous approaches to the subject matter, but also in their widely varying views 
that enable a broad understanding of the relevant contributing factors. In a later section of 
this thesis, a particular academic publication by New York University (NYU’s) Center 
for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) is analyzed in detail to provide the reader 
with a clear picture of what the exact criticisms are against terror sting operations. 
(2) Government Journals/Publications. These government-
published works are similar in quality to the academic types of literature but tend to focus 
more on best practice research or evaluative research designed to measure the 
effectiveness of the practices and policies. Some of this literature is useful in improving 
the general understanding of the subject matter. One example is the Library of Congress’ 
Congressional Research Service publication entitled, “American Jihadist Terrorism: 
Combating a Complex Threat,” which provides valuable insight into homegrown violent 
jihadists. Others include agency narratives surrounding notorious court cases, radicalism 
in general, and the government’s creative methods used to combat this phenomenon.15 
Another example is the National Preparedness Group’s publication, Preventing Violent 
Radicalization in America, which gives detailed recommendations regarding what steps 
government officials can take in addressing some of the Muslim community’s concerns 
                                                 
14 Julius Wachtel, “From Morals to Practice: Dilemmas of Control in Undercover Policing,” Crime, 
Law and Social Change 18, no. 1 (1992): 137–158. 
15 Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex 
Threat,” DTIC Online, December 7, 2010, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA536056. 
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regarding what it perceives as government spying in their communities.16 Some of this 
class of literature does not necessarily emanate from American government agencies but 
is nonetheless relevant to the research. One example is Great Britain’s Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) report, which discusses in great detail undercover 
police tactics and makes recommendations for their use while delineating the benefits of 
addressing the public’s concerns regarding such tactics. The U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) discusses sting operations in great detail in its Problem-Oriented Guide for Police 
Response series. In this journal, the DOJ identifies and analyzes each of the widely used 
police sting operations, as well as their benefits and negative effects.  
Collectively, government publications serve as a strong foundation 
for gaining a deep understanding of the core issues and practices surrounding deceptive 
law enforcement practices. Much effort has gone into government research projects post 
9/11, and what results is a vast array of resources of significant value to this research. 
(3) Private Organizations/Think Tank Publications. Private 
resources in this genre of literature are useful for gaining an understanding of the 
different views and positions regarding law enforcement’s proactive counterterrorism 
efforts. While they appear to be somewhat biased at times, an understanding of the main 
positions is beneficial to the research. The Muslim Public Affairs Council, a Muslim 
advocacy group, offers an excellent example by detailing the phenomenon of radical 
extremism while explaining the effects of proactive policing on the Muslim community 
and terrorism itself, and by concluding with useful recommendations for improving 
police-community relations. While the report comes from the perspective of the group’s 
goals, it is well written, researched, and of value to the relevant research. Of particular 
interest is their conclusion that proactive, infiltrative law enforcement efforts have served 
to create the fear within terrorist groups themselves that informants are present within 
their groups.17 
                                                 
16 Dr. Peter Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America (National Security Preparedness 
Group, 2011), 31. 
17 Alejandro J. Beutel, “Building Bridges to Strengthen America, Forging an Effective 
Counterterrorism Enterprise Between Muslim Americans and Law Enforcement,” Muslim Public Affairs 
Council 19 (2010). 
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Other publications in this class offer particularly good summaries 
of each of the most notorious police informant/fake plot arrests in the past few years to 
include the Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA) and a publication by The 
Council on Foreign Relations to name two.18 Other sources in this class offer extremely 
valuable contributions to this research, including the New America Foundation’s policy 
paper entitled, “The FBI’s Secret War Against the ‘Patriot’ Movement, and How 
Infiltration Tactics Relate to Radicalizing Influences,” which provides an in-depth 
analysis of law enforcement’s infiltration efforts to include the use of agent 
provocateurs.19 Another example is the Muslim Advocate’s study of the Patriot Act’s 
effect on the Muslim community entitled, “Losing Liberty: The State of Freedom Ten 
Years After the Patriot Act.” This publication offers a highly critical study of the 
expanded government powers that arose out of a post 9/11 era.20 
Overall, the publications released by privately-funded 
organizations offer interesting and well-researched perspectives into the core issues 
surrounding law enforcement’s proactive, post 9/11 tactics, as well as analyses of the 
more notorious cases of infiltration given from the perspective of non-governmental 
observers, which is useful for study as well. 
b. Informational 
Materials reviewed in this category of literature can be divided into two 
sub-categories of hearings/testimony and news publications/sites. 
(1) Hearings/Testimony. Some of the most vocal critics of law 
enforcement’s infiltrative practices were not particularly careful to provide accurate 
portrayals of the relevant cases; most notably, those publications that were particularly 
biased or political in nature. A good example in practice is the academic publication, 
“Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States” 
                                                 
18 See http://www.nefafoundation.org; Toni Johnson, “Threat of Homegrown Islamist Terrorism,” 
September 30, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/threat-homegrown-islamist-terrorism/p11509. 
19 J. M. Berger. “PATCON, The FBI’s Secret War Against the ‘Patriot’ Movement, and How 
Infiltration Tactics Relate to Radicalizing Influences,” New America Foundation, May 21, 2012, 
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/patcon. 
20 Muslim Advocates, “Losing Liberty: The State of Freedom 10 Years After the Patriot Act,” 12. 
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by NYU’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. The publication’s portrayal of 
defendants arrested in certain cases as innocent individuals tricked into committing 
terrorist acts is a red flag for researchers. Although the NYU publication is significantly 
politically influenced, and exudes bias in that regard, it was valuable as a synthesized 
source of widely held criticisms against terror sting operations. The publication, 
therefore, served well as a primary source of what amounts to a detailed, scholarly 
expression of the substance and logic of the “anti-sting” argument.  
The single best sources of verification were the court testimony 
transcripts themselves. Indeed, the courtroom transcripts painted a very different, factual 
picture—core material facts, such as defendants’ incriminating statements or actions, 
were present in the courtroom but were routinely omitted in the preceding document. 
Other documents, including the transcript for the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security’s Muslim Radicalization, and the intelligence-sharing 
and terrorism risk assessment hearings, provide a much needed indication of the current 
political conversation on these topics and how current efforts are being measured.21  
Both courtroom transcripts for the relevant criminal trials, and 
hearing transcripts, provide unabridged data for review when it is particularly useful to 
test hypotheses or conclusions. 
(2) News Publications/Sites. The news reports reviewed 
provided interesting perspectives into arrests resulting from the use of informants or other 
infiltrative tactics by law enforcement. Although this type of literature is distinct from the 
opinion-based class discussed further on, these reports do generally follow the political 
bias of the news site reporting. The difference is that the opinion-based class of literature 
is a public statement of opinion, while the manner in which the news bias is presented is 
more subtle. An interesting example is the contrast from which the New York Times, a 
politically left-leaning newspaper, differs from the New York Post, a politically 
conservative newspaper in reporting the same subject matter. The New York Times 
                                                 
21 Committee on Homeland Security, “Hearing on the Extent of Radicalization in the American 




reports on August 31, 2010, on the trial of James Cromitie, one of the Bronx synagogue 
plot conspirators, and the focus is almost completely on Cromitie’s apparent coercion by 
the government to commit his acts. The Times indicates that he was offered an enormous 
amount of money to commit the act by a government informant, and that he tried to back 
out on more than one occasion.22 Meanwhile, the Post, reporting on the same hearing on 
the same date, paints the picture of Cromitie as a flagrant anti-Semite whose recorded 
statements are described as “chilling” in the trial, and how he bragged about being a 
soldier, but not for America.23 The news publications vary from highly opinionated 
examples like the ones just mentioned, to more politically neutral accounts of the trials 
and arrests. 
News publications and sites provide the researcher with different 
highlighted points, perhaps the most sensational, which is useful for gauging the effect of 
the news on the public psyche. Perhaps loyal followers of each source are highly 
influenced by the political bias of the media reporting on the issue; or perhaps, the effect 
is not measurable enough to sway public opinion. In either case, these classes of literature 
provide useful samples of the public discourse. 
c. Opinion-Based 
For the purposes of this research, opinion-based literature is divided into 
two sub-categories: magazines and videos.  
(1) Magazines. This class of literature is somewhat more of a 
philosophically sophisticated approach to arguments from particular corners of the 
political spectrum than the politically-leaning news sites above. An example is an article 
entitled, “Deploying Informants, the FBI Stings Muslims” by the self-described “Flagship 
of the Left,” The Nation, which presents a skillfully crafted perspective on some of the 
more notorious cases of informant and terror sting operation cases. The article goes into 
great depth on the history of the practice, as well as some of the effects it has had on U.S. 
                                                 
22 Kareem Fahim, “Tapes Show James Cromitie Wavering on Terror Plot,” The New York Times, 
August 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/nyregion/01plot.html. 
23 Rick Calder, “Bx. ‘Bomber’s Hatred for Jews,” New York Post, August 31, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/bx_bomber_hatred_for_jews_CUr7F41Pn9Nj10PqJCGfpK. 
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freedoms. While one may agree or disagree, the article is well-supported by factual 
references and makes for good debate material. The value to the researcher is that these 
articles paint a detailed picture of how these practices tend to rile up people in opposition 
to them. All the materials in this category made similar criticisms, and, unfortunately, 
opinion-based magazines supporting law enforcement’s use of informants and contrived 
plots have been elusive thus far. 
(2) Video Reports. Video specials and documentaries in 
support of convicted terror plot arrestees generally critical of the FBI’s practices abound 
on Youtube.com and throughout the Internet, in particular those by RT (Russian 
Television), which holds the monopoly on these types of programs, are highly critical 
anti-FBI productions presented as documentaries or newscasts.24 Democracy Now!, an 
independent left-leaning news program, also produced several news commentaries on the 
law enforcement practice.25 While generally highly biased against law enforcement in 
general, these programs provide a valuable insight into the exact cases being made 
against the government by supporters and family members of individuals arrested in these 
plots. They generally cite coercion and persistence on the part of the government as the 
driving force behind the actions of the individuals arrested in these plots.  
2. Key Publications  
While hundreds of highly critical articles and publications regarding terror sting 
operations exist, two publications stand out particularly as representing serious research 
efforts into the subject, and have therefore, been selected for closer analysis. Both these 
publications chronicle the facts surrounding specific cases in which the authors make 
their cases that terror sting operations constitute entrapment or other forms of government 
abuse.  
                                                 
24 See http://rt.com or youtube.com. Searches for “rt fbi sting” yield multiple results of various 
broadcasts surrounding the same subject matter. One example: YouTube, “FBI Agents Craft Their Own 
Terror Plots,” 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vzb4aaTGNjk&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
25 Example: Democracy Now! “Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants 
Raises Questions About Validity of Terrorism Cases.”  
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a. NYU CHRGJ Publication 
In 2011, NYU CHRGJ published a report entitled Targeted and 
Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States. As a 
significant academic undertaking on the subject, it bears mentioning in this thesis since it 
articulates the more common criticisms against terror sting operations. The research value 
of the report, however, is somewhat limited since it can be argued that the report is 
replete with inflammatory rhetoric and politically influenced predispositions which, at 
minimum, take away from its objective value and otherwise substantial presentation. 
Examples include broad sweeping characterizations of government intent, unsupported 
claims regarding the innocence of subjects, and statements that exude political bias 
including the presumption that terrorism and radical Islamist ideology is not a problem 
among Muslims at all, and that the Muslim community should not be a focus of law 
enforcement efforts.26 While this hypothesis can certainly be raised and researched, it is 
naïve or disingenuous at this point to suggest that radical Islamism in Muslim 
communities is not, at minimum, an issue worth discussing. Putting 9/11, the Fort Hood 
shooting, the recent Boston bombings, and the many failed terrorist attempts aside, it is 
not a stretch to the imagination to realize that an ideology does exist among many in the 
Muslim world that calls for violent attacks on civilians to further its goals. While the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans are opposed to acts of terrorism against 
civilians in defense of Islam, according to the most recent Pew poll, 8% say that such 
terrorism is often, or sometimes, justified.27 This estimate indicates that nearly one in 10 
Muslims in the United States believe this to be true.  
The CHRGJ report then goes as far as labeling the radicalization process 
as myth.28 The tendency of the authors to deny that problems with radicalization and 
violent Islamist ideology even exist in the Muslim community anywhere, takes away 
                                                 
26 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 6–
7. 
27 PewResearch Religion & Public Life Project, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, 
“Executive Summary,” April 30, 2013, http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-religion-
politics-society-exec.aspx. 
28 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 7. 
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from the credibility of the report; as does their apparent defense of the defendants’ 
conduct in each of the cases covered. An example is a passage in its analysis of one of the 
cases covered in the report—the case of the Fort Dix Five. The report begins by laying 
out the family’s picture—perfect American story, how the family traveled to Six Flags 
every year, went on picnics, attended the mosque every Friday, and then it makes the 
following statement about the family: 
They had no idea that two decades later their sons would themselves end 
up the victims of discrimination—at the hands of the country they had 
believed in—with all three sent to prison for the rest of their lives on 
terrorism charges for a plot that was, in fact, created by the FBI.29 
The report minimizes the disturbing facts surrounding the case, among 
them that these men were convicted by a jury, were recorded numerous times making 
jihadist statements, purchased machine guns illegally, and were in possession of Al 
Qaeda videos and propaganda. The publication glosses over these facts and makes 
inflammatory, politically motivated statements, which again, seems to take away from its 
academic value. The report does serve, however, as a valuable summation of the most 
common of criticisms, which are presented in a clear, understandable manner; and raises 
legitimate points of concern regarding informant behavior; and is therefore, worth 
analyzing for the purposes of understanding the criticisms against this practice more 
clearly. In addition, the report makes specific, well thought-out recommendations that 
merit serious consideration. 
In Targeted and Entrapped, the CHRGJ accuses American law 
enforcement agencies, specifically the FBI and NYPD, of entrapping Muslim males in 
contrived terror plots. The publication specifically cites abuses by untrained informants 
as being particularly problematic, and challenges many fundamentally held beliefs of law 
enforcement agencies regarding the radicalization process and proactive policing in 
general.30 The report continues to criticize the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and 
Operations Guide (DIOG) guidelines, which characterizes them as practically the 
                                                 
29 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 26. 
30 Ibid., 6–8. 
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equivalent of not having guidelines at all, and further emphasizes that the guidelines 
allow agents to engage in surveillance and infiltration of individuals with no prerequisite 
criminality on the part of the subject.31 It further states that, under the guidelines, 
informants are basically given carte blanche to engage in criminal conduct. In fact, the 
report alleges that through the guidelines, informants are basically granted the right to 
engage in entrapment with no legal protections afforded to targets of the operations.32 
The report also further criticizes the NYPD’s Handschu guidelines, which were modified 
post 9/11 in 2003 to expand the department’s intelligence gathering abilities by stating 
that the amendment to the guidelines is based upon the “flawed radicalization model.”33 
Finally, the report accuses the American government of engaging in international human 
rights violations and recommends that sweeping changes be implemented to bring a stop 
to what it characterizes as a direct assault on the Muslim community. 
(1) Entrapment. Targeted and Entrapped spends a substantial 
amount of time explaining the entrapment defense since it is a central tenet of the 
argument the journal is making against the use of terror sting operations, particularly in 
the cases cited. The report explains that when a defense of entrapment is raised, the 
defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (51%) that the defendant was 
induced by the government to commit the crime. Once the inducement is established, the 
prosecution must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s predisposition to 
committing the crime. The report then identifies the fact that two tests determine 
entrapment—the subjective test, which relies on proving the defendant’s predisposition to 
the crime, and the objective test, which deals with the government’s conduct in inducing 
the crime instead of the defendant’s mental culpability. The authors concede that the 
entrapment defense never produces favorable results for the defendants and blame 
Islamophobia and sensationalism in conjunction with the unpopular jihadist speech and 
media that often arises in these cases and is shown to juries to determine predisposition.34 
                                                 
31 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 10. 
32 Ibid., 14, 18. 
33 Ibid., 13. 
34 Ibid., 16.  
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The argument is that such speech and written material should be protected as free speech, 
however unpopular, but is not because it is sensational in nature and adds to the allegedly 
erroneous sentiment that a homegrown threat of terrorism exists.35 
(2) Cases. Each of the three cases discussed in Targeted and 
Entrapped are presented in three sections—The Family, The Case, and The Impacts. The 
apparent purpose of the report is to elicit the reader’s sympathy for the families affected 
by the subsequent arrests of their relatives and to convince readers that terror sting 
operations are government acts of entrapment. Noticeably missing from each case study 
are the implications of each of the subject’s actions. Their culpability and intentions in 
each of the plots are not addressed; the reader is led to infer that the suspects’ willingness 
to plant bombs and shoot people is not really a determination of guilt if significantly 
influential external forces compel them to action.  
(3) Recommendations by the Authors. The CHRGJ concludes 
its report with specific recommendations it believes must be enacted to prevent what 
constitutes international human rights violations against the Muslim community. The 
recommendations are paraphrased in abridged form as follows. 
• Muslim radicalization theories should be rejected 
• Congress should hold hearings on informant practices and 
intelligence gathering in the affected communities to determine 
what the impact of the practices are 
• The End Racial Profiling Act should be passed to ban racial 
profiling by law enforcement agencies 
• The DOJ must modify its 2003 Federal Guidance on Racial 
Profiling to ban profiling and to make the guidance enforceable 
and to eliminate loopholes 
• The DOJ should reopen and investigate all informant terrorism 
cases since 9/11 to identify abuse by informants 
• The U.S. Attorney General should produce new guidelines for the 
FBI and other agencies to follow for the purposes of allowing 
terrorism cases only when prior suspicion has been established; 
preventing acts of entrapment by law enforcement; and eliminating 
profiling based on religion, race, etc. 
                                                 
35 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 16. 
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• The NYPD should only conduct operations on subjects already 
reasonably suspected of criminal activity 
b. The Terror Factory  
Trevor Aaronson is the author of The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s 
Manufactured War on Terrorism. This book is a product of his substantial research into 
500 terrorism related arrests following 9/11. As an investigating reporting fellow at the 
University of California, Berkeley, Aaronson spent months reading through court 
transcripts across the country, and his work represents the product of a significant 
academic research effort into terror sting operations. The data generated from his 
research has proven to be useful to this thesis. His research and data is based upon the 
DOJ’s clearly delineated definition of terrorism-related arrests.36 Aaronson’s data sets of 
terrorism-related arrests, meeting the DOJ’s criteria, have been deposited into a 
searchable database online at MotherJones.com (MJ), a politically left-leaning online 
magazine.  
While the title of the book, its affiliation with MJ, and its basic 
conclusions represent left-leaning political views held by the author and its affiliates, 
unlike the CHRGJ publication, this book is presented in such a way that it does not 
minimize, deny, or gloss over any of the defendants’ actions. As he presents each of the 
cases, he interjects his opinion that consistently and repeatedly amounts to one basic 
premise—each of the defendants was operationally incapable, either financially, 
intellectually, or otherwise, of committing the crimes he committed without the 
assistance of law enforcement, and would therefore, have never been a threat absent the 
terror sting operation. Aaronson levels some very serious allegations at law enforcement 
in this work.  
While The Terror Factory is not divided into sections in which each case 
is discussed in structured form, it is helpful for the purposes of extracting Aaronson’s 
core criticisms to highlight at least one case that demonstrates the claim that persists 
                                                 
36 Trevor Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism (Ig 
Publishing, 2013), 12–13. 
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throughout the book—that targets of these operations are not in and of themselves 
dangerous without the elaborate scenarios constructed by the government.  
(1) Michael Curtis Reynolds. Aaronson describes Reynolds as 
a drifter with bad credit and serious mental problems. He immediately emphasizes that 
Reynolds attempted to blow up his parents’ home in 1978 by creating a homemade bomb 
made of gasoline, paint, propane fuel, and an ignition device complete with a timer.37 
Reynolds eventually married, and the author stresses that his wife left him because of the 
extreme nature of his ideas, including a reported desire to build a castle complete with 
turrets. Eventually, Reynolds logged into a pro-Osama bin Laden online forum and asked 
for help in bombing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Within a day, he was contacted by 
someone who ultimately turned out to be an FBI informant, and who offered him the 
means and finances ($40,000) to realize his desire. Reynolds was arrested by the FBI 
upon attempting to meet the accomplice, and after his subsequent trial, was sentenced to 
30 years in prison.38 
What follows after this narrative is the position that Aaronson 
takes repeatedly throughout the book; that is, that individuals targeted in these operations 
are not a danger to anyone without the assistance and involvement of law enforcement. 
His sentiment is expressed as follows. 
Despite his conviction, was Reynolds a dangerous terrorist? The answer is 
no—he was a troubled man unlikely to escape the fringes of society. He 
talked big and had a history of doing stupid things. He was unemployed, 
broke, and living with his mother at middle age, a caricature of the all-
American loser. But an informant posing as an Al Qaeda operative offered 
him more money than he had ever seen at one time in his entire life and 
overnight he became a “threat to our safety.39 
While this section of this thesis is not intended to be a book 
review, but rather an attempt to provide context from the literature, it may be beneficial 
                                                 
37 Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism, 10. 
38 National Terror Alert Response Center, “Man Gets 30 Years in Terror Plot to Blow Up Pipelines,” 
November 6, 2007, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2007/11/06/man-gets-30-years-in-terror-plot-to-
blow-up-pipelines/. 
39 Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism, 11. 
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to give serious thought to Aaronson’s fundamental and persistent premise which the 
author believes those who support the use of terror sting operations would disagree 
with—that premise being that Reynolds is not dangerous. If the person answering him in 
the forum were not an informant, but rather a real person capable of financing such a 
task, would he not be just as dangerous then? The FBI in this instance has possibly saved 
lives by apprehending this individual before he encountered someone willing and able to 
finance a real attack.  
(2) Informants. Aaronson has a clear disdain for informants as 
they are quite often criminals themselves and often engage in ethically reprehensible 
behavior for money, befriending individuals, making the targets of the operations, which 
he views as weak minded or naïve, look up to them, eating dinner in their homes, and 
ultimately, in his view, entrapping them into committing acts that land them in prison for 
decades. In the book, he highlights that the informants have cumulatively committed acts 
worse than those they are attempting to instigate. These individuals often continue to 
commit crimes while acting as informants for the FBI, and despite being caught 
committing these acts, continue to be utilized for the terror sting operations. All this, says 
Aaronson, is to fulfill a need that the law enforcement community, and the general public 
to some degree, have to catch terrorists. Radical Islamist terrorism is obviously a 
phenomenon that Aaronson does not perceive as a real threat, and he therefore views 
much of the FBI’s $3.5 billion a year approach to counter-terrorism as a waste of 
resources. The vehicle that enables what he views as a misappropriation of public funds 
is the informant network—without which the effectiveness of the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies would be substantially degraded. 
(3) FBI Ulterior Motives. Aaronson aims most of his criticisms 
at the FBI and believes that their ever-increasing informant base constitutes a nefarious 
and sinister spy network—a network that blankets the entire nation and creates eyes and 
ears for the government. Aaronson harbors very suspicious beliefs about the FBI’s 
approach to terror sting operations. Among them, he indicates that the FBI intentionally 
fails to record certain aspects of its operations so that it can hide informant misconduct or 
other aspects of each case that may endanger the outcome. Aaronson also clearly believes 
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that the FBI uses its operations to justify its enormous budget by sensationalizing cases in 
which what he believes to be harmless individuals are showcased as extremely dangerous 
persons caught in the nick of time. He believes that, with these operations, the FBI 
demonstrates to the taxpaying public that the FBI’s hefty $8 billion annual budget is 
necessary to protect Americans from a danger he does not believe exists. Additionally, 
Aaronson makes clear that the FBI intentionally targets easily influenced individuals who 
are what he frequently describes as on the fringes of society—individuals who are naïve, 
young, destitute, unemployed, or otherwise inept , and are easily lured into these 
elaborate plots that are ultimately a justification for the existence of large counter-
terrorism budgets. Aaronson also makes clear that he believes that the FBI intentionally 
targets the Muslim community because, under the guise of countering terrorism, the 
American public tolerates the overly aggressive tactics. He indicates that Americans 
would not tolerate these same exact tactics for other nationalities.40 
(4) Core Criticisms Extracted. The following list represents the 
core criticisms Aaronson has expressed regarding the use of terror sting operations. 
While most of his book directly or indirectly targeted the use of informants by the FBI, 
the accusations were fueled by some of the same sentiments seen in other critical 
literature. 
• The Muslim community is being targeted because of who they are 
• The threat to the American public is exaggerated or non-existent 
• Informants are overly aggressive and overly instrumental, if not 
completely responsible for the plots 
• Suspects in these operations are harmless without the government 
plots 
• Terror sting operations amount to a complete waste of money  
• The operations are used to justify the existence of large budgets 
• The use of informants requires more oversight 
• The entrapment defense is insufficient because of widespread anti-
Muslim bias 
                                                 
40 Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism, 225. 
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c. Conclusion 
These two bodies of literature analyzed in this section represent good 
examples of the litany of articles, journals, blogs, videos, and other material that harshly 
criticize the use of terror sting operations. After reading a vast amount of these examples 
of critical literature, themes began to emerge; and they are well-codified in the two works 
reviewed in this section. With little difficulty, it can be concluded that informant conduct 
is among the most criticized elements of terror sting operations. Informants are 
repeatedly accused of being overly instrumental in contributing to each suspect’s decision 
to engage in acts of terrorism. While law enforcement agencies, and the American public 
to some degree, may disagree with many of these criticisms, both sides of the arguments 
can meet on some of the concerns. It is apparent that central to this issue is the lack of 
adequate standards of acceptable behavior with regard to informants. Throughout the 
literature, informants consistently generate the most controversy, and their behavior can 
be described as bizarre at times.  
It is also apparent that the Muslim community, civil rights activists, and 
critics maintain that Muslims are being taken advantage of to some degree during the 
course of these operations. The lack of success that the entrapment defense has 
experienced throughout the 500 cases reviewed, and the very long prison sentences that 
suspects receive, are believed to be signs that the American public is viewing this issue 
differently than other criminal issues, which may be obvious considering the post 9/11 
counter-terrorism culture under which Americans currently live. Perhaps some methods 
exist, however, that law enforcement agencies can utilize to close the gaps between 
critics and proponents of terror sting operations; and those methods are discussed in the 
recommendations chapter.  
3. Conclusion 
A dichotomy of opinions is found in the literature on this topic. On the one side is 
outrage from the private sector, and on the other, a complete dismissal of the criticisms 
from the legal and professional field. It is as though the legal authorities do not consider 
it necessary to even entertain any of the accusations from the Muslim community and 
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civil rights circles. Indeed, it may be unnecessary from a legal standpoint considering the 
very successful track record the practice has from a prosecutorial point of view.  
This state of affairs, from the perspective of one conducting research for a thesis, 
is both undesirable, since it is hoped to be able to draw from an expansive collection of 
literature, and desirable, since this appears to be a vast, uncharted territory ready to take 
the researcher wherever he wants to go. 
D. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
1. Sample 
This research focuses on law enforcement’s practice of using confidential 
informants or undercover officers, particularly within the Muslim community to target 
potential terrorists who ultimately participate in fake terrorist attacks. The particular 
focus is on the methods used to introduce the undercover officer or informant, as well as 
the methods used to encourage the target of the operation to become involved. The 
purpose of analyzing these methods is to attempt to get to the root of what particular 
practices generate the most controversy or, at minimum, to get to the root of the practices 
that lend credence to critics who maintain that they amount to entrapment, spying, or 
profiling.  
2. Sample Selection 
The selection of this particular law enforcement policy for this research was 
motivated particularly by the recent public outcry by some in the Muslim community that 
has taken the form of public demonstrations and subsequent media attention. Indeed, 
throughout 2012, the progress made by the NYPD in gaining the cooperation and trust of 
the Muslim community seems to have been set back somewhat by that community’s 
perception that law enforcement agents are spying on their mosques and conducting 
surveillance based upon racial profiling. Both the need to maintain a strong partnership 
with the Muslim community and the need to apprehend potential terrorists are paramount 
in this post 9/11 era. Therefore, the aim of this research is to simultaneously attempt to 
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solidify the usefulness of using terror sting operations while attempting to identify ways 
that law enforcement can reduce these negative perceptions.  
Operations selected for analysis were chosen based upon the availability of 
academic-quality literature that clearly identifies the problematic aspects of the 
operations as perceived by the Muslim community, civil rights circles, legal 
professionals, and academics. Terror sting operations were also selected for analysis 
according to the sheer amount of critical literature available. Therefore, both the quality 
and quantity of critical literature played a crucial role in the selection of cases reviewed. 
Cases were required to have generated considerable controversy in the media, and were 
required to be presented in qualified academic publications for serious consideration and 
analysis. The four cases selected for analysis in Chapter III were The Newburgh Four, 
The Fort Dix Five, the Shahawar Siraj Matin case, and the Ahmadullah Sais Niazi and 
Craig Monteilh case. 
3. Data Sources 
This research sought to identify the core variables that contribute the most to the 
controversy surrounding both terror sting operations and the surveillance that precedes 
them, by identifying the most cited complaints and attempting to synthesize them into an 
identifiable set of characteristics that can be addressed. While admittedly possessing a 
somewhat subjective character, constant themes arise throughout the literature, some of 
which are well-articulated by legal and academic authorities. These sources, which 
include appeals by academic institutions to the government for regulation or oversight of 
terror sting operations coupled with media reports covering them, as well as criticisms 
arising out of Muslim demonstrations and public outcries, provide a basis for 
summarizing the most common complaints against the use of the terror sting operations.  
4. Mode of Analysis 
This research used a policy analysis method, whereby the main problem of 
determining how to continue to use terror sting operations while simultaneously 
addressing the Muslim community’s complaints was analyzed. The current practice was 
analyzed, frequent criticisms were identified, and changes were proposed based upon the 
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legitimacy of the criticisms to enhance the policy and address the criticisms against it. 
Recommended changes were made based upon the impact they would have on actually 
addressing the shortcomings of the current policies law enforcement agencies adhere to 
regarding the use of terror sting operations. What should be noted, however, is that the 
current use of terror sting operations is arguably quite successful. No findings of 
entrapment have ever been upheld in these cases and no court convictions against 
terrorists arrested in these operations have ever been reversed. This research, therefore, 
operated under the assumption that increasing the public support of the Muslim 
community is something that is desirable, and that such an increase can be achieved 
without having a detrimental effect on the results of the sting operations. This thesis is 
summarized as follows. 
• Identified the problems by extracting and synthesizing them from the best 
available literature 
• Recommended changes based upon addressing the strongest criticisms 
against the practice 
• Laid out what is at stake, and what the costs and benefits are to 
implementing the changes 
• Identified what is sacrificed in implementing the policy changes and 
determined if trade offs are possible 
• Made recommendations that best preserve the success of the terror sting 
operations and best addresses what are perceived as civil rights abuses by 
the Muslim community 
• Summarized as clearly as possible the complete recommendation, as well 
as its implementation to provide a course of action for agencies to take to 
strengthen the partnerships they have with their Muslim communities, 
while maximizing the effectiveness and usefulness of terror sting 
operations41 
5. Output 
Initially, the majority of the literature reviewed for this research, which was 
overwhelmingly negative, increasingly gave the impression that terror sting operations 
                                                 
41 Method based largely upon the following work: Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy 
Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving 4E (CQ Press, 2011), 
http://books.google.com/books?id=HQFBN3L7FRIC. 
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were perceived to be fraught with abuse, scandal, and carelessness by critics. Careful 
consideration of the most controversial of cases, as well as the cases that did not generate 
much publicity, revealed that, while law enforcement has room for improvement 
(particularly with regard to informants), the real problem exists in the perception that a 
relatively small amount of operations are producing in the Muslim community and in 
civil rights circles. The research revealed that the vast majority of these operations, when 
conducted to fruition, always succeed in court; legally, they are upheld repeatedly and 
seldom generated controversy. However, instances occur in which informant conduct or 
instructions given by law enforcement handlers are questionable and leave substantial 
room for improvement. The research demonstrated that, in these cases, informants and 
investigators operated independently of agency regulations, and were allowed to 
improvise to a great degree. The more disconnected the investigator and informant were 
from agency guidelines, the more likely it became to find controversial actions on the 
part of the actors—actions including the offering of $250,000 to a suspect by an 
informant to commit the act;42 or the repeated goading of the suspect to commit the act 
despite his repeated objections.43 Under normal circumstances, any number of people 
offered such a large amount of money can arguably be convinced to commit a crime, and 
it is unclear what real counter-terrorism value exists in such a proposal. In addition, in 
many instances, informants seemed to play too large of a role in orchestrating the plot 
and moving it forward. While the suspect is ultimately responsible for his actions, an 
overly aggressive informant gives the impression to outside observers that law 
enforcement agents are unscrupulous and that their operations are designed to target the 
gullible or vulnerable rather than the truly dangerous.  
What emerged from this research were recommended policy changes comprised 
mostly of changes to agency policy regarding decision-making executive oversight, 
quality control, and training. These recommendations, if implemented, would limit the 
incidence of problematic cases, and would ultimately bring about reasonable redress of 
the Muslim community’s grievances while not negatively impacting upon the beneficial 
                                                 
42 Narula, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States, 22. 
43 Ibid., 36. 
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effect of utilizing terror sting operations. Ideally, the result of this research is an 
improved approach to the successful apprehension of terrorists that simultaneously 
garnishes the support of the Muslim community and sufficiently addresses the criticisms 
against the practice. The goal of this undertaking was, therefore, to provide valuable 
recommendations that would serve to close the gap between law enforcement and the 
Muslim community regarding the use of these tactics to the greatest degree possible. 
6. Upcoming Chapters 
Chapter II focuses on providing the reader with a basic understanding of sting 
operations and context for terror sting operations, briefly examining the use of informants 
in general, giving an overview of the operational guidelines that law enforcement 
agencies are required to adhere to regarding the use of informants, presenting a look at 
the statistical data related to terror sting operation arrests, and finally, reviewing the 
complex nature of Muslim community relations in this post 9/11 counter-terrorism era. 
Chapter III focuses on analyzing four terror sting operation cases, which were 
selected based upon their role in creating controversy, as well as their inclusion in 
reputable academic journals that sought to garner political action against the use of terror 
sting operations. The chapter identifies the aggravating factors in each case, and 
synthesizes them into a simplified set of factors that form the basis for recommendations 
to follow in the next chapter.  
Chapter IV concludes with a recapitulation of the identified problems and a set of 
recommendations formulated to address the most prevalent of complaints against terror 
sting operations directly. Each recommendation is discussed in depth, and is followed by 
a section on implementing the recommendations with benefits, risks, costs, and possible 
oppositions discussed. 
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A. STING OPERATIONS 
American law enforcement agencies have been employing sting operations since 
the 1970s in their struggle against narcotics trafficking, organized crime, child 
pornography, political corruption, and a host of other crimes. In its fundamental form, a 
sting operation is essentially a law enforcement agency’s attempt to facilitate the 
commission of a crime by introducing an undercover officer to a subject and attempting 
to afford that subject the opportunity to commit the crime that person is predisposed to 
committing. Typically, the target of the operation is one whom the law enforcement 
agency reasonably suspects is seeking to commit the crime staged. Some operations, 
however, do not necessarily target specific persons, but rather, are intended to tempt 
passersby into committing the crime.  
One example of these random types of stings is the decoy operation. Agencies 
including the NYPD have used these proactive strategies in an effort to arrest potential 
thieves before they steal from innocent victims. During decoy operations, undercover 
officers typically pretend to be intoxicated or asleep in public and have money, jewelry, 
or other valuables readily visible on their person. When a suspect approaches the 
undercover agent and removes the property, he is immediately arrested and charged with 
the larceny. In these instances, the law enforcement agents are not targeting any specific 
person—anyone who takes the bait will be arrested. The general guideline thus 
paraphrased that has been established for law enforcement to avoid the entrapment 
defense is that law enforcement must merely afford the perpetrator the opportunity to 
commit a crime, and not actively encourage the individual to commit the crime.  
Many types of sting operations involve the use of deceptive tactics including 
disguises, storefronts, informants, fake online identities, and others designed to 
psychologically immerse the target of the operation in the fabricated environment or 
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situation.44 For the purposes of this research, the primary type of sting operation studied 
is the terror sting operation. Typically, terror sting operations involve the use of 
informants or undercover agents actively engaged in assisting the defendants in 
detonating inert devices or otherwise executing plots designed to cause mass casualties.  
B. SAMPLE CASE—HEMANT LAKHANI 
The first post 9/11 terror sting operation orchestrated entirely by government 
officials involved an Indian-born individual named Hemant Lakhani who claimed not to 
be a supporter of Islamists.45 Lakhani was an arms dealer who had a reputation for 
transacting with terrorist groups regardless of their causes. Lakhani exhibited enthusiasm 
about obtaining rocket launchers (200 of them) for an undercover FBI informant who 
indicated a desire to take down American jet liners. The informant, Muhammed Habib Ur 
Rehman, had worked for the FBI before and was reportedly paid more than $400,000 
over 19 years in his role.46 Lakhani eventually traveled to the Ukraine several times in 
unsuccessful attempts to secure rocket launchers for Rehman. Eventually, the FBI 
enlisted the assistance of Russian law enforcement agents who posed as weapons dealers 
and promised him delivery of the rockets. Lakhani went as far as establishing a network 
of bank accounts so that he could secrete the $86,500 he received for the one rocket. The 
Russian agents eventually came through, shipping a single (inert) rocket launcher to the 
United States; and Lakhani was placed under arrest in a Newark, New Jersey motel.47 He 
was sentenced to 47 years in prison after unsuccessfully raising the entrapment defense. 
Lakhani failed to convince the jury that he was entrapped, mostly because he had made 
numerous statements indicating his desire to see 15 airplanes shot down and because of 
his several self-financed trips to Russia in which he attempted to procure the rocket 
launchers himself. This situation, the prosecution argued, demonstrated his predisposition 
                                                 
44 The following publication provides a general basis for the proceeding examples of sting operations 
and is valuable for a general understanding of the practice: Newman, Socia, and United States Department 
of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Sting Operations: By Graeme R. Newman with 
the Assistance of Kelly Socia, Issue 6, Problem-oriented Guide for Police, Response Series. 
45 Robert Hanley, “Jury Hears 2 Views of Man Accused in Missile Scheme,” The New York Times, 
January 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/05/nyregion/05missile.html. 
46 Wadie E. Said, “The Terrorist Informant,” Washington Law Review 85, no. 4 (2010): 720. 
47 Hanley, “Jury Hears 2 Views of Man Accused in Missile Scheme.”  
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to commit the crime, which is an essential factor in defeating the entrapment defense. The 
defense argued, however unsuccessfully, that Lakhani was the only non-governmental 
participant in the plot; he was effectively dealing with government agents on all sides, 
and without the government’s involvement no plot would have transpired.  
C. INFORMANTS 
Confidential informants represent the most controversial component of the terror 
sting operation. Throughout the literature, informants were accused by critics of immoral 
behavior, lying, manipulating, coaxing, and behavior that otherwise allegedly 
undermined the legitimacy of the charges levied against defendants in these cases. This 
research would not be complete without providing some background on the use of 
informants.  
The use of confidential informants in American law enforcement is not a recent 
phenomenon. In fact, as early as 1975, the FBI was utilizing at least 1,500 registered 
informants for domestic cases.48 Today, the FBI maintains at least 15,000 registered 
informants, with some sources alleging three unofficial, unregistered informants for every 
one that is listed.49 In any case, it is clear that the FBI, and law enforcement agencies 
throughout the nation, rely heavily upon the use of informants, which is no surprise since 
confidential informants enable law enforcement agencies to gain valuable intelligence 
and strategic information otherwise unobtainable. The importance of the use of 
informants in law enforcement cannot be overstated. In United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 
where the defendant was arrested for narcotics possession based upon the use of an 
informant, the U.S. Court of Appeals made the following observation concerning 
informants. 
 
                                                 
48 U.S. Department of Justice, “The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Compliance with the Attorney 
General’s Investigative Guidelines, Chapter Two: Historical Background of the Attorney General’s 
Investigative Guidelines,” Special Report, September 2005, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0509/ 
chapter2.htm. 
49 Trevor Aaronson, “The Informants,” Mother Jones, September/October 2011, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants. 
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It is also true, however, that our criminal justice system could not 
adequately function without information provided by informants and 
without their sworn testimony in certain cases. This need is created by our 
rules permitting persons accused of crime to confront the witnesses against 
them, measures that elevate the hearsay rule to Constitutional dimensions. 
Moreover, it is a well-known phenomena that the higher-ups in criminal 
enterprises attempt to insulate themselves from detection and exposure by 
having their unlawful schemes carried out by others. Without informants, 
law enforcement authorities would be unable to penetrate and destroy 
organized crime syndicates, drug trafficking cartels, bank frauds, 
telephone solicitation scams, public corruption, terrorist gangs, money 
launderers, espionage rings, and the likes.50 
Informants often evoke skepticism in criminal cases for several reasons, notably 
the deceptive nature of involving an oftentimes sordid individual acting on behalf of 
qualified law enforcement agents who themselves possess training and knowledge that 
the informant does not. Informant involvement and testimony is often characterized as 
unreliable by defense attorneys who seek to undermine the credibility of these individuals 
who are frequently career criminals themselves. Therefore, while acknowledging the 
importance of utilizing informants, the U.S. Court of Appeals in the above case went on 
to caution. 
By definition, criminal informants are cut from untrustworthy cloth and 
must be managed and carefully watched by the government and the courts 
to prevent them from falsely accusing the innocent, from manufacturing 
evidence against those under suspicion of crime, and from lying under 
oath in the courtroom. As Justice Jackson said forty years ago, “The use of 
informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other 
betrayals which are ‘dirty business’ may raise serious questions of 
credibility.”51 
Indeed, throughout the literature, the most persistent criticisms of law 
enforcement from Muslim and civil liberties groups surround the use of informants. 
Some have alleged that the general use of confidential informants by law enforcement 
agents has actually contributed to changes in the social fabric of inner city 
neighborhoods. This alleged phenomenon is argued to be the result of criminal 
                                                 
50 Appeals, United States Court of, and Ninth Circuit, “989 F2d 331 United States v. Bernal-Obeso” 
F2d, no. 989 (November 5, 1992): 331. 
51 Ibid. 
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informants leveraging their positions for selfish, criminal gain by providing information 
beneficial to their own criminal enterprises and detrimental to their competition in the 
streets. Critics allege that police allow, facilitate, or even encourage, their informants to 
engage in criminal conduct, and thereby, contribute to increases in crime through the use 
of these individuals; particularly in minority neighborhoods.52 
This specific component of terror sting operations and counter-terrorism 
operations in general represents the area that would arguably benefit the most from policy 
changes. The use of informants, while critical to law enforcement investigations, has 
resulted in the degradation of law enforcement/community relations because of the level 
of improvisation and freedom that informants are afforded since they undergo little or no 
training. A good example is the Craig Monteilh case, which is discussed at length in this 
thesis. His behavior created a significant disruption in community relations, and 
ultimately, netted no law enforcement benefit despite costing the government over 
$100,000. An additional problem is that investigators do not always follow their 
informant guidelines (as seen below), which hampers the agency’s ability to sustain 
effective quality control. 
In 2005, the FBI Office of the Inspector General (OIG) summarized its findings 
after a three-year review of FBI practices following the 9/11 attacks. The OIG found 
compliance errors in 87% of the FBI files they reviewed concerning informants. The OIG 
offered this finding in its executive summary. 
Our review found that FBI Headquarters has not adequately supported the 
FBI’s Criminal Informant Program, which has hindered FBI agents in 
complying with the Confidential Informant Guidelines. Although we 
noted some improvements in this area during the course of our review, in 
many instances agents lacked access to basic administrative resources and 
guidance that would have promoted compliance with the Confidential 
Informant Guidelines. For example, the FBI did not have a field guide or 





                                                 
52 Natapoff, “Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,” 689. 
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also did not plan for, or provide, adequate training of agents, supervisors, 
and Confidential Informant Coordinators on informant policies and 
practices.53 
Many of the compliance failures surrounded routine notifications or requests for 
approval for certain informant conduct including committing crimes, which requires the 
approval of bureau attorneys or upper level executives. Failure to receive approval for 
allowing informants to commit crimes is a violation of The Department of Justice’s 
Guidelines Regarding the Use of Informants as stated in paragraph (III)(C)(1). 
A JLEA shall not authorize a CI to engage in any activity that otherwise 
would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law 
if engaged in by a person acting without authorization, except as provided 
in the authorization provisions in paragraph (III)(C)(2) below.54  
The authorization provisions it refers to includes regulations requiring that prior 
approval is to be obtained in advance and in writing from bureau and judicial sources.55 
In defense of these findings, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III was quoted as 
saying that the informant regulations were difficult to comply with and complicated.56 
Given the size and scope of the FBI, it is undoubtedly true that implementing 
administrative guidelines that are dynamic in nature is difficult given the size and scope 
of the FBI’s nationwide operation in its 56 field offices. However, in response to the OIG 
investigation, Kevin R. Brock, an Assistant FBI Director is quoted as saying, “We were 
handling more and more sources, we had more and more regulations that we added on 
over the years, and we weren’t doing the follow-up quality control on our own.”57 This 
statement indicates that room exists for improvement in the way the FBI conducts quality 
control, and in the incidents involving unusual informant conduct, better overview may 
                                                 
53 U.S. Department of Justice, “The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Compliance with the Attorney 
General’s Investigative Guidelines, Chapter Two: Historical Background of the Attorney General’s 
Investigative Guidelines.” 
54 U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential 
Informants,” January 8, 2001, http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ciguidelines.htm. 
55 Ibid., (III)(C)(2). 




have served to prevent embarrassment of the agency, or at minimum, expenditure of time 
and resources in addressing litigation against the Bureau. The FBI, however, did attempt 
to improve upon its DIOG compliance by instituting training in which investigators had 
to attend 16.5 hours of classroom training on the DIOG and had to pass a written exam 
afterwards. The purpose of this training and test was to ensure compliance with the 
DIOG. Unfortunately, during a 2010 investigation, the OIG found that cheating was 
widespread. 
In our limited investigation, we found that a significant number of FBI 
employees engaged in some form of improper conduct or cheating on the 
DIOG exam, some in clear violation of FBI directives regarding the exam. 
Some consulted with others while taking the exam when that was 
specifically forbidden by the test-taking protocols. Others used or 
distributed answers sheets or study guides that essentially provided the 
answers to the test. A few exploited a programming flaw to reveal the 
answers to the exam. Several supervisors, including two ASACs, two 
SSAs, and a legal advisor, were involved in such cheating. Almost all of 
those who cheated falsely certified on Question 51 (the final question of 
the exam) that they had not consulted with others.58 
It is apparent that much simpler regulations would be more effective in improving 
agency-wide adherence to fundamental regulations governing the use of informants. The 
relative freedom that informants and handlers enjoy independent of complex, unwieldy 
guidelines, results in further damage being done to sensitive community relations. 
D. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 
The FBI and NYPD are presently the only two agencies that conduct terror sting 
operations on their own. Therefore, the Handschu guidelines that the NYPD is required to 
follow, and the Mukasey and DIOG guidelines that regulate the FBI’s intelligence 
capabilities, are discussed briefly as follows.  
                                                 
58 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “Investigations of Allegations of 
Cheating on the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DOIG) Exam,” September 2010, 
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1. The NYPD and Handschu Guidelines 
In the 1960s, political unrest arising out of anti-war movements produced protests 
and demonstrations in the streets of New York City. The NYPD’s Special Services 
Division conducted surveillance of political groups including the Black Panthers. That 
group and others teamed up with an attorney named Barbara Handschu who filed suit 
against the NYPD in Handschu v. Special Services Division, and the case remained in 
litigation until 14 years later. A negotiated settlement was reached that resulted in the 
NYPD being required to adhere to the Handschu guidelines. The guidelines basically 
stated that to monitor or investigate political activity, the NYPD had to have reasonable 
suspicion that the group was involved in criminal activity beforehand. The purpose of 
these guidelines was to prohibit the NYPD from engaging in the surveillance or 
infiltration of political groups without cause as such surveillance was determined to 
impede free speech. The guidelines required that the NYPD gain the approval of an 
independent panel before commencing political investigations. 
a. Modified Handschu Guidelines 
On February 11, 2003, Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. for the United States 
District Court of the Southern District of New York, ruled that the NYPD could modify 
the original Handschu guidelines, which now give the NYPD greater latitude in 
conducting investigations against individuals or groups by allowing the investigations to 
be approved by the department’s own Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence as opposed 
to the previous guidelines that required the approval of an external panel.59 This 
determination was made in consideration of the threats that New York City faced in a 
post 9/11 era and gave the NYPD the ability to initiate investigations in advance of 
unlawful conduct, particularly under exigent circumstances, without having to obtain 
prior approval from a legislative body.  
                                                 
59 Brett M. Ringo, “Domestic Terrorism: Fighting the Local Threat with Local Enforcement” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 36–37. 
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b. Discussion 
Muslim activist groups have accused the NYPD of spying and profiling, 
and some view the expanded Handschu guidelines as granting the NYPD a dangerous 
amount of flexibility that requires more oversight.60 Under the modified guidelines, the 
NYPD can initiate investigations and conduct surveillance of groups for many months 
with the initial requirement being that the facts reasonably indicate that a future crime 
will be possible.61 It can be imagined that the NYPD would have great freedom to 
monitor the activities of the Occupy Wall Street movement, for example, since many 
participants of the movement did frequently break the law, and the movement in general 
did repeatedly plan to disrupt financial institutions by blocking entrances to crucial 
finance sector facilities—an act which in and of itself is illegal. With 9/11 in this nation’s 
rear view mirror, it would seem to most that expanding the abilities of the NYPD is 
crucial to the department’s mission to stay ahead of violent jihadists, and the NYPD’s 
excellent record of terrorism prevention is at minimum a testament to the necessity of 
relaxing overly stringent laws. Since 9/11, the NYPD has prevented 16 radical Islamist 
terrorist attacks,62 which is undoubtedly due to the NYPD’s enormous counter-terrorism 
efforts to which it devotes a significant portion of its manpower.  
2. Mukasey Guidelines 
On September 29, 2008, the 81st U.S. Attorney General, Michael B. Mukasey, 
published The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.63 The 
“Mukasey Guidelines,” as they are frequently called, deal with the FBI’s powers to 
conduct operations domestically and to collect foreign intelligence. One of its purposes 
was to broaden the FBI’s analysis capabilities to combat domestic acts of terrorism 
effectively. The document’s primary function was to establish the FBI as an intelligence 
                                                 
60 Michael Price and Faiza Patel, “Unchecked NYPD Operations In Need Of Oversight,” Brennan 
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gathering agency and not just as a law enforcement agency. The Mukasey guidelines also 
specified that the National Security Division’s Oversight Section and the FBI’s Office of 
General Counsel were responsible for regularly inspecting the Bureau for compliance 
with the guidelines and other applicable laws. 64 While broadly empowering the FBI for 
domestic intelligence activities, the guidelines clearly require that the FBI conduct its 
operations within the boundaries of the U.S. Constitution and prohibit the FBI from 
monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment and constitute free speech.  
The Mukasey guidelines also served to firmly establish the FBI’s authority to 
conduct intelligence and counter-intelligence operations against groups or individuals 
when such persons are reasonably suspected of engaging in acts that threaten the national 
security of the United States.65 The guidelines established broad information-gathering 
powers for the FBI in the interests of detecting and preventing acts of domestic terrorism. 
The document further established “predicated” investigative powers, particularly a new 
phase called an assessment, which permits the FBI to engage in an investigation without 
a threat to national security or substantiated criminality,66 which is the portion of the 
Mukasey and DIOG guidelines most relevant to this thesis, as it significantly expands an 
investigator’s powers by allowing this person to conduct a threat assessment with only 
these requirements.  
The investigator must determine an authorized purpose; follow specific 
work flows for management and documentation; not initiate based solely 
on the exercise of these First Amendment rights (unless a group exercising 
its First Amendment rights also threatens or advocates violence or 
destruction of property); and must ensure that the assessment is an 
appropriate use of personnel and financial resources.67 
The requirements grant an investigator significant authority in assessing the 
danger coming from a particular person or group as long as it is for an authorized  
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66 Ibid., 18. 
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purpose. It would follow logically that preventing jihadist terrorism is an authorized 
purpose and this is what grants the FBI significant latitude in beginning investigations in 
locations sensitive to the Muslim community.  
The predicated powers further permit the agency to engage in broad investigative 
actions in response to any allegation of criminal activity or activity that threatens national 
security provided that preliminary investigations last no longer than six months.68 The 
guidelines further establish the enterprise investigative powers of the FBI that empower 
the agency to investigate groups or organizations provided that the organization is 
suspected of engaging in clearly delineated criminal activity. The guidelines also provide 
the FBI with authority to assist local agencies in conducting investigations and 
intelligence analysis. In summary, the Mukasey guidelines were established to define and 
delineate clearly the FBI’s domestic intelligence and investigatory powers, and to provide 
an oversight structure. The document does this in a very detailed and meticulous manner 
by specifying exact methods that the agency is authorized to use and the levels of 
authorization needed at each stage. Interestingly, the Mukasey guidelines make no 
mention of informants specifically, which is surprising given the major part informants 
play in FBI intelligence gathering; however, it does bear mentioning that other internal 
guidelines do govern the use of informants.69 
3. DIOG 
The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide was issued by the FBI on 
December 16, 2008, in response to the Mukasey guidelines. The purpose of the DIOG 
was to help implement the Mukasey guidelines in terms of FBI operational procedures by 
releasing regulations that codified all the previous regulations into one guide that was in 
compliance with The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. One 
of its stated purposes was to standardize policy and create consistency throughout the 
FBI. The document concerns itself with the three stages of the FBI investigative process: 
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assessment, preliminary investigation, and full investigation. The DIOG delineates when 
and how each stage can be conducted by field agents. For example, to conduct a 
preliminary investigation, the following must be met: “A federal crime or a threat to 
national security has, is, or may occur; or, an individual, group, property, or activity is, or 
may be, a target of federal criminal activity or threats to the national security, and the 
investigation may obtain information relating to the subject(s) involvement in such 
activities or protect against the activity or threat.”70 The DIOG guidelines delineate each 
of the duties of investigators as they relate to the investigations being conducted in a 
manner that ensures compliance with the Mukasey guidelines.  
In 2011, the FBI released an updated version of the DIOG in response to feedback 
received regarding the original guidelines in an effort to improve upon the oversight 
process of cases and to broaden the FBI’s abilities to gain potential informants by 
allowing trash searches of individuals not currently under investigation by the Bureau. 
The purpose of this extension in FBI powers is to make it a simpler and more expedited 
matter to vet possible informants.  
E. STATISTICAL DATA ON DEFENDANTS 
Quantifying terror sting operations is particularly challenging since they are 
typically only brought to light during criminal court proceedings and subsequent news 
reports. Unsuccessful operations, or operations that remain classified for various reasons, 
including protecting the identity or existence of undercover operatives, are difficult to 
account for. Some, however, have undertaken to collect data on these types of operations 
based upon the cases released by the U.S. DOJ, and other cases that fit the DOJ’s criteria. 
“Mother Jones,” an online politically left-leaning magazine, assembled a useful 
online index of domestic terrorism incidents since 9/11. According to the compilation, a 
total of 508 defendants have been charged with terrorism-related activity since 9/11.71 
The cases are categorized as informant, agent provocateur, and/or sting operations. The 
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online searchable database is based upon the research of Trevor Aaronson, a particularly 
vocal opponent of terror sting operations, and author of the book, The Terror Factory: 
Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism. During a CBS interview, former FBI 
Assistant Director of Public Affairs John Miller, characterizes Aaronson’s book as “…an 
amazing piece of reporting,” based on a, “…stunning amount of research.” While 
ultimately disagreeing with Aaronson’s criticisms and conclusions, Miller further 
characterizes Aaronson’s approach to the research as, “…very objective about laying out 
the facts.”72 For the purposes of this research, therefore, it proved useful to refer to the 
data gathered by Aaronson and catalogued by MJ, since some consensus does exist as to 
the accuracy of the historical data.  
Some interesting statistics regarding the defendants arrested include the 
following. 
• 243, or 48%, were targeted by informants 
• 158, or 31%, involved sting operations 
• 49, or 10%, resulted from the use of an informant who led the plot 
• 299, or 59%, of the defendants had a connection to some terrorist 
organization 
• 107, or 21%, to Al Qaeda 
• 146, or 29%, to other Islamist groups 
• 46, or 9%, to other terrorist groups 
• 208, or 41%, had no reported connection to any terrorist organization 
                                                 




Figure 1. Defendant Nexus to Terrorist Groups 
According to the MJ database, terrorism cases have been filed in 35 states and in 
Washington, DC. New York had the most prosecutions with 120, followed by Michigan 
and Florida with 45 each. The most common charge against the defendants was 
“Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” (18 U.S.C. §2339B of the U.S.A. Patriot Act) 
in 192, or 38%, of the cases; followed by “Plotting Violence Abroad” in 68, or 13%, of 
the cases. In addition, 121, or 24%, of the defendants were charged with immigration 
violations, while 36, or 7%, were charged with “Funding Terrorists.” Also, 25, or 5%, 
were charged with “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and 51, or 10%, were charged with 
RICO laws.  
F. COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
The FBI and NYPD have employed terror sting operations with consistent success 
in the years since 9/11. Initially, these arrests generate significant public interest and are 
met with relative approval by the media. Positive press conferences typically follow and 
details emerge regarding the length of the investigations, the use of confidential 
informants, and the fact patterns that illustrate the seriousness of the terrorist acts that 
could have potentially claimed numerous lives if they were real. The immediate  
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impression is that the American public by and large reacts positively to the news when 
the stories are originally released, and is not, however, representative of the Muslim 
community’s perception regarding the operations.  
1. Why Should We Care? 
In the Muslim community, each case that comes to light, and all the details 
surrounding the infiltration of the government into their communities and mosques, 
highlight the reality that sympathizers, terrorists, and government agents are in their 
midst. Many in this community are embarrassed at the stigma that they have of being 
terrorists, and they describe the sense that they have been ostracized among other 
Americans because of 9/11 and the problem of Islamist radicalization.73 Muslims are 
willing to assist law enforcement with weeding out this problem since they have found it 
difficult to do on their own and are generally embarrassed by the perception. Members of 
the Muslim community have helped law enforcement many times in the past and have 
been instrumental in providing valuable information that stopped terrorist attacks and 
resulted in key arrests being made. 74 
The balance between a cooperative and proactive Muslim community and one 
that has complete distrust for government is delicate. The infiltration necessary to 
facilitate terror sting operations has undoubtedly contributed to a sense of distrust 
towards law enforcement in the Muslim community, and radical groups in America have 
seized this opportunity by organizing protests and uniting some in the Muslim 
community against law enforcement.75 This distrust has served to strengthen the voice of 
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those who preach against the west and against the U.S. government; which may actually 
be increasing the rate of radicalization in this country since radical groups in the Muslim 
community are using the fact that government agents are infiltrating their communities as 
a springboard to launch their radical agenda that seeks to drive a wedge between the 
Muslim community and the American government. Law enforcement agencies may be 
giving radical Islamists a voice they would not otherwise have, which could in turn, 
strengthen their message.  
To understand how this may be happening, it is important to understand what 
drives the process of radicalization from the outset. Many have undertaken to study the 
process of radicalization and the reasons that otherwise normal, educated persons become 
seduced by radical ideology. What has arisen out of these studies are indications that 
typical psychopathic or sociopathic theories of behavior seem inadequate to explain; 
instead, individuals who have committed themselves to the ideology do so for reasons 
that have much to do with the contexts of their lives, the influence of situational factors, 
and sentiments that arise out of in-group/out-group dynamics with strong influences from 
religious beliefs.76 
The ideology behind this process has sway in the Muslim world. Research reveals 
that powerful ways of combating radicalization exist, and the methods are surprisingly 
inexpensive and effective. By analyzing the intricacies of radicalization and how and why 
it occurs, it is possible to begin to understand how to counter its effects. Commonalities 
emerge within populations particularly susceptible to radicalism. These commonalities 
include poverty, unemployment, alienation, lack of integration into society, and 
unresolved grievances and injustices against the government with no legitimate channels 
of political redress available.77  
American Muslims in this country by and large begin their lives more prosperous 
and less exposed to some of the more negative conditions of their counterparts who live 
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in other countries where basic necessities are not met. Oppressive government corruption, 
poverty, and unemployment in the United States are not the widespread epidemics they 
are in other countries, which is evident in the American Muslim community, particularly 
when compared to its European counterparts. American Muslims typically have more 
money, are more skilled, have more of a say in their political future, and become citizens 
more easily.78 Not surprisingly, American Muslims are less likely to radicalize than their 
counterparts in Europe.79  
Local police departments in this country have had great success, therefore, in 
nurturing relationships with the Muslim community, and mutually beneficial advantages 
to these arrangements have arisen—advantages that impact positively on law 
enforcement’s counterterrorism efforts, and counter the power of the radical Islamists’ 
ideology.80  
What needs to be clarified at this point, however, is that the political discontent of 
the Muslim community and its disapproval of the host country may always be present 
regardless of the attempts of the country to integrate and accommodate its interests. 
Muslims, by and large, may always feel that America is sympathetic to Israel, for 
example, or that America meddles in Arab affairs needlessly. They may disagree with 
American foreign policy, distrust the government, and even despise American customs in 
some cases. The focus, therefore, of law enforcement agencies should not be to win the 
hearts and minds of the Muslim community (although that would be desirable), but rather 
the more achievable goal of reducing the likelihood that radicalization will spread in U.S. 
Muslim communities—to strip the ideology of its power since many resort to the 
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ideology when alternative means of redress are not available.81 In other words, law 
enforcement must focus on removing the appeal of using the violent methods of 
radicalization and replace that appeal with one for the legal methods of this nation’s 
system of government that are more than capable of providing Muslims with legal 
remedies. This very simple goal can begin to be accomplished by ensuring that U.S. 
Muslim communities have a system for addressing their grievances—that can be 
accomplished with the mere existence of a community liaison in the local police station, 
for example, who can act on their complaints and implement real solutions. The 
community affairs outreach program of the NYPD serves as a good example of an 
agency’s efforts to maintain close liaison between law enforcement and community 
leaders.82 
Local municipalities have long recognized the benefits of community policing and 
maintaining strong community ties in general. This approach has helped foster mutually 
beneficial relationships between local police departments and community members for 
the purposes of fighting crime, gathering intelligence, and gaining community support. 
Some police departments have gone to extraordinary lengths to achieve real, tangible 
partnerships with their Muslim communities. Among the most notable examples of this 
include the NYPD’s extensive community outreach programs, including its joint 
operation with the Vera Institute of Justice that served to strengthen the bonds between 
the police department and the Arab community, and its ongoing community affairs 
liaison program in all of the city’s precincts that contain Muslim populations.83  
Although the NYPD’s community outreach programs are extensive and 
renowned, the department has found itself at the receiving end of harsh criticism from the 
Muslim community, leading to the current dilemma that law enforcement agencies, such 
as the NYPD are encountering. Law enforcement has a profound responsibility to protect 
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citizens from terrorism and must employ cutting edge tactics to accomplish this 
obligation. Terror sting operations are undoubtedly effective, since they not only catch 
willing would-be terrorists, but also create a lingering sense among radicals in the 
Muslim community; that FBI agents, local law enforcement, and informants are 
everywhere. Unfortunately, that same police omnipresence is reportedly felt by the 
average Muslim worshipping in a Mosque. It is clear from the available literature that 
many American Muslims believe that the U.S. government and local law enforcement 
agencies like the NYPD are present in their mosques and communities and are spying on 
them.84While this belief may have the positive effect of removing the pulpit from 
radicals in Muslim institutions, it has the negative side effect of creating an enormous 
sense of distrust towards law enforcement—particularly when informants engage in 
conduct considered to be ethically repulsive by Muslims.  
Some of the actions of informants have united large Muslim communities in 
angry opposition to the government, particularly when the informant’s actions seem to 
serve no legitimate purpose other than surveillance.85 From a radical Islamist’s point of 
view, an opportunity is created for him to validate his message—that the U.S. 
government and local law enforcement agencies are at war with Islam and that it is their 
duty to fight in this war. This unfortunate side effect of infiltrating Muslim locales has 
served to undo much community policing progress and has united the Muslim community 
in some instances with groups like Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
against law enforcement.86 
2. Summary 
In summary, the practice of allowing investigators relative freedom in deploying 
confidential informants and undercover agents into Muslim communities without strict 
adherence to agency guidelines may be significantly reversing community policing 
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progress. A Wall Street Journal article highlights some of the alleged damage done to the 
growing relationship between the Muslim community and the NYPD, which has been at 
the forefront of proactive counterterrorism operations along with the FBI. 
Sheikh Reda Shata was among those singled out for surveillance because 
of his “threat potential” and what the NYPD considered links to 
organizations associated with terrorism, despite having never been 
charged with any crime […] During his time at the Islamic Center of Bay 
Ridge since 2002, he welcomed FBI agents to his mosque to speak to 
Muslims, invited NYPD officers for breakfast and threw parties for 
officers who were leaving the precinct. As police secretly watched Shata 
in 2006, he had breakfast and dinner with Bloomberg at Gracie Mansion 
and was invited to meet with Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Shata 
recalls.[…] The dichotomy between simultaneously being partner and 
suspect is common among some of New York’s Muslims. Some of the 
same mosques that city leaders visited to hail their strong alliances with 
the Muslim community have also been placed under NYPD surveillance 
— in some cases infiltrated by undercover police officers and confidential 
informants. In April, more than 100 area imams publicly supported a rally 
to “oppose wars, condemn terrorism and fight Islamophobia.” Of those, 
more than 30 were either identified by name or work in mosques included 
in the NYPD’s listing of suspicious people and places in 2006.87 
By and large, the response from the law enforcement community to these 
allegations has amounted to denial. The majority of the literature available on the topic of 
informants and infiltration into the Muslim community is highly critical of the practice, 
and little has been accomplished in so far as addressing the criticisms and restoring the 
credibility of law enforcement agencies within Muslim communities. It should be noted, 
however, that from a legal perspective, terror sting operations, which almost always 
begin with infiltration into the Muslim community, have been repeatedly upheld by U.S. 
courts. Another point worthy of serious consideration is that the proactive work of 
agencies like the NYPD and FBI has helped thwart numerous attacks and saved many 
lives, and it is therefore not the purpose of this research to impugn the reputation of the 
men and women who comprise these law enforcement agencies; or of the innovations in 
law enforcement that have granted law enforcement success in the fight against terrorism. 
Rather, the purpose of this research is to attempt to identify best practices based upon 
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identified deficiencies that can be implemented to improve upon terrorist sting operations 
in a manner that helps garner more support from the Muslim community and less 
criticism.  
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III. CASE ANALYSIS 
A. SELECTIONS 
When considering which cases should be selected for analysis, it became 
immediately apparent that setting the criteria would be difficult and somewhat subjective. 
Law enforcement has employed terror sting operations in 158 cases and in 49 of those 
cases, the law enforcement informant led the plot.88 Some cases have attracted significant 
negative media attention, and others have not. Some have attracted significant attention 
from civil rights circles but not from the media or academic circles. Others have gained 
momentum as a result of the families of the defendants embarking upon prolonged public 
campaigns to raise awareness for their cause. Many cases gained media attention when 
defendants arrested in terror sting operations raised the entrapment defense.  
While the overall amount of literature critical of terror sting operations is 
abundant with similar themes of criticisms, the major issue that seems to connect them all 
is questionable informant conduct. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to select the cases 
that were informant driven, appeared to garner the most negative press attention, and 
whose criticisms have been codified in academic or professional publications as prime 
examples of problematic terror sting operations. Successfully measuring public 
discontent is difficult and most likely unachievable; however, for the purposes of 
understanding the most common of criticisms against terror sting operations, these cases, 
which seemed to generate a significant amount of critical reporting and were presented in 
professional or academic publications, were a good starting point.  
NYU CHRGJ’s report entitled, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the 
Homegrown Threat in the United States, was useful in this regard since the cases it 
analyzes are presented in a comprehensive manner, with criticisms clearly outlined. 
Trevor Aaronson’s book entitled, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured 
War on Terrorism, also proved to be useful since the author conducted significant 
                                                 
88 Mother Jones, “Terror Trials by the Numbers,” September/October 2011, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/terror-trials-numbers. 
 52 
research spanning years and clearly presents his case regarding what he believes are 
problematic operations. Other forms of literature reviewed were highly sensationalized 
opinion editorials, and seemed to offer less analytical value. 
B. THE CASES 
1. The Newburgh Four 
This case is discussed in detail by the CHRGJ publication. It is presented from the 
perspective of one of the four defendants, David Williams, whose story is told as a 
tragedy in which Williams, a convicted drug dealer who had recently been released from 
prison, is bent on finding a way to pay for his brother’s medical treatments. Williams was 
approached by James Cromitie, one of the four defendants in the now infamous Bronx 
Synagogue plot, and was ultimately asked to participate in an attack on a Bronx 
synagogue; but, according to Williams, Cromitie had promised that no one would be hurt 
and that he actually planned to take the money without carrying out the plot.89 Cromitie 
had been approached by a purportedly wealthy Pakistani businessman who called himself 
“Maqsood.” Maqsood was actually a paid FBI informant named Shahed Hussain. 
Hussain had offered Cromitie $250,000 dollars, luxury cars, and according to the report, 
financing for a barber shop.90 This offer, which may be a substantial part of what 
motivated Cromitie to commit his crime, was actually an improvisation by the informant 
who later testified that he did not receive this from the FBI and instead meant it as some 
code word with Cromitie; during his testimony, he commented that Cromitie may have 
had the impression that he was going to receive that amount of currency.91 Other 
literature has drawn attention to the over-zealousness of the informant in this case; 
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pointing out that the offering of financial rewards to terror sting subjects potentially 
diminishes the operations’ overall legitimacy.92 
Maqsood allegedly insisted that Cromitie hire lookouts, who would also be paid, 
but had to be Muslim.93 According to the CHRGJ report, Maqsood was originally sent by 
the FBI into Newburgh to spy on a local mosque, but was quickly ostracized by mosque 
members because of his overly enthusiastic jihadist rhetoric. Ultimately, Maqsood drove 
four individuals, James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams (no relation to David), 
and Laguerre Payen, to a Bronx synagogue on May 20, 2009, where they placed an FBI-
supplied fake bomb in a vehicle parked outside of the location and attempted to detonate 
it. The four were arrested and were subsequently sentenced to 25 years in federal prison.  
The CHRGJ report also chronicles the devastating effect the arrest of David 
Williams had on his family. His mother, Alicia, lost her apartment, lost her friends, was 
unable to find work, and ultimately, blames all of it on their family being labeled as 
terrorists.94 David’s younger brother, Lord, blames himself for being responsible for 
David’s lack of judgment since it was allegedly motivated by the costs of his brother’s 
medical treatments; and Lord has been teased and harassed because of his brother being 
labeled a terrorist.95 Ms. Williams clearly blames the government for her son’s 
involvement in this act; and feels as though it is somewhat of an elaborate plot 
perpetrated against her family, and Muslims in general, by the FBI. The report 
summarizes this sentiment. 
Alicia quickly realized that David’s case was just one of dozens of cases 
where informants were inserted into Muslim communities to lure young 
Muslim men into participating in concocted plots. She became close with 
several other families and urged them to speak out.96 
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a. The Criticisms 
The CHRGJ report on the Newburgh Four case zeroes in on the alleged 
exploitation of David Williams’ financial situation and desperation regarding his 
brother’s sickness as one of the main criticisms of the government’s strategy in the 
operation. It also alleges that the FBI informant, Shahed Hussain, had been attempting to 
convince James Cromitie to plant bombs at a local synagogue for eight months.97 The 
report further alleges that Hussain offered to take the Williams family on a trip to Disney 
World. Williams’ mother, Alicia, characterizes the operation as an elaborate scheme, 
saying, “We got pulled into a political game. The case was directed, produced, and 
scripted by the FBI, and all they needed were puppets.”98 The judge presiding over the 
Newburgh Four case was quoted expressing similar sentiment. 
Even Judge Colleen McMahon—who put the Newburgh Four behind 
bars—slammed the FBI. “Only the government could have made a 
terrorist out of Mr Cromitie, a man whose buffoonery is positively 
Shakespearean in its scope,” she said in court. She added: “I believe 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here 
except the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to 
fruition.”99 
The defendants pled not guilty and petitioned the court for a dismissal 
based upon “outrageous government conduct” and entrapment; the petition was denied. 
Finally, the CHRGJ report directly criticizes the expenditure of government funds for an 
unreal threat in their opinion, as stated by Ms. Williams. 
Newburgh is an extremely impoverished town. How much money did they 
spend on this whole production? They need to be investing in our 
communities for the future, not spending millions of dollars on a fake case 
that makes nobody safer.100 
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In summary, the literature analyzed levels five main criticisms against 
terror sting operations in the Newburgh Four case. 
• The government exploited a subject in difficult circumstances 
(Williams and his sick brother) 
• The informant was over-zealous and overly involved in convincing 
the subject to commit his act 
• The informant resorted to offering large amounts of money and 
goods to convince the subjects 
• The expenditure of large amounts of money on these operations 
were a misuse of government funds 
• No real danger existed to anyone but for the government-contrived 
plot 
2. The Fort Dix Five 
The CHRGJ report begins by detailing the family lives of Eljvir, Dritan, and 
Shain Duka—three brothers among the five men arrested in the Fort Dix plot. The other 
two men, Mohammed Shnewer and Sadar Tatar, were friends of the Duka brothers. The 
brothers first generated law enforcement interest when they brought a video to a local 
Circuit City to make copies. According to this report, in the video, the five men are seen 
with their friends, skiing, playing pranks, riding horses, playing paintball, and shooting at 
a Poconos shooting range. A clerk at the Circuit City store noticed that the men were 
saying, “Allahu Akbar” during the shooting scene and subsequently turned the video into 
local police. According to the report, the FBI were notified, began following the brothers, 
and sent two informants in to infiltrate the group. The two informants, Mahmoud Omar 
and Besnik Bakalli, became close to the group, and Bakalli became especially close with 
the brothers and was frequently invited to their home. 101 
Throughout the next year, the informants recorded hundreds of hours of 
conversations with the brothers, Shnewer, and Tatar. According to the CHRGJ report, the 
two informants allegedly “bombarded” the brothers with talk of violence, attempting to 
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get them to commit violent acts by questioning their manhood and encouraging the group 
to download radical Islamist videos. Omar drove Shnewer to the Fort Dix Army base in 
August 2006, and according to the report, the government classified that trip as 
reconnaissance. In addition, Omar also approached the brothers with a list of weapons 
and offered them more if they wanted. The report indicates that the brothers wanted to 
procure the weapons because they did not want to have to wait in line at the firing range 
on their next trip to the Poconos. The brothers ultimately ordered several weapons from 
Omar, and when they went to pick them up, were arrested by law enforcement agents and 
charged with conspiracy to attack the Fort Dix Army base and weapons possession. The 
brothers’ defense attorney fought the conspiracy charges on the basis that the brothers 
had no knowledge of the plot against Fort Dix, citing the fact that Shnewer and Omar 
went on the reconnaissance trip alone, and the brothers were never recorded talking about 
the plot. The defense also pointed out that the brothers were recorded on tape making 
statements that opposed violence and Jihad, particularly in one instance when Eljvir was 
heard saying that an attack of U.S. soldiers is forbidden by Islam since they have not 
done anything wrong on U.S. soil.102 
Despite the defense’s arguments, all five of the defendants were convicted. The 
report points out that via an “extraordinary government request,” the identity of the jurors 
was kept secret and that this particular practice added to the notion that the defendants 
were dangerous, and therefore, contributed to the suspicion of guilt. 103 Lastly, the report 
alleges a biased, partial jury in that juror #3 had a son who was a Marine and was 
wounded in Iraq; and the juror was quoted stating that the videos shown to her at trial, 
which the informants encouraged the defendants to download, reminded her of the attack 
on her son.104 The brothers were subsequently sentenced to life in prison, with Dritan and 
                                                 





Shain receiving a sentence of life plus 30 years; Mohammed Shnewer was sentenced to 
life plus 30 years, and Serdar Tatar was sentenced to 33 years.105 
The CHRGJ report continues to illustrate the damage that the arrests of the 
brothers had on the Duka family, and like the previous Newburgh case, places the blame 
squarely on the government for targeting their sons. It further states that Ferik Duka, the 
father of the brothers, was arrested the same night his sons were arrested, and was 
detained for one month because the status of his immigration was being questioned.106 
Similar to the Newburgh case, the report points out that the Duka family was no longer 
able to make money and that they were ostracized by friends and the community in which 
they resided. Like Ms. Williams in the Newburgh case, the Duka family has been 
engaged in demonstrations and efforts to bring awareness to their case. Lejla, Dritan 
Duka’s daughter, is quoted as saying, “it’s not just my father’s case, there are thousands 
of cases just like this, and we need to step forward, so we can actually be a free 
country.”107 
a. The Criticisms 
This publication claims that the introduction of the informants into the 
Duka circle was discrimination, and that the family was selected based upon their 
religion. It homes in on the government informants’ behavior as the particular catalyst for 
the events that transpired. The informants are accused of goading the brothers into action 
by challenging their manhood; encouraging them to download jihadist videos; taking 
them on the reconnaissance trip to Fort Dix; encouraging them to buy weapons that they 
themselves provided; creating ties between the plot and the brothers; fabricating the 
entire plot that the brothers were convicted of conspiring; and basically engaging in 
entrapment. Finally, the report implies that the Duka family is still under government 
surveillance today.108 
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In summary, this report attempts to establish the following criticisms of 
terror sting operations in the Fort Dix Five case: 
• The suspects were selected for surveillance on questionable 
evidence related to their religious beliefs (the video) 
• The suspects, the Duka brothers, had no knowledge of the plot but 
were drawn in and convicted anyway due at least in part to the bias 
of the American public against jihadist rhetoric even when it 
constitutes free speech 
• The informant was over-zealous and overly involved in creating 
the plot and convincing the suspects to commit to it 
• There was no real danger to anyone apart from the government 
contrived plot 
• The jury was biased by their own anonymity, and were biased 
against the defendants 
3. Shahawar Siraj Matin 
This case involves Shahawar Siraj Matin, a 22 year old Pakistani immigrant who 
worked in his uncle’s bookstore in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. According to the CHRGJ 
report, in November of 2002, an undercover NYPD officer known as Kamil Pasha visited 
the bookstore and befriended Shahawar, often talking to him about 9/11, Bin Laden, and 
bombings in Pakistan. Shahawar’s conversations with Pasha were later used against him 
in the trial. An NYPD informant named Osama Eldawoody was allegedly instructed to 
befriend Shahawar, presumably after he was identified as a potential extremist by Pasha. 
Eldawoody became close to Shahawar and his close friend, James Elshafay, who would 
later be arrested along with Shahawar. Elshafay is described in the report as a nineteen 
year old schizophrenic. As Eldawoody and Shahawar grew closer, Shahawar apparently 
regarded Eldawoody as a father figure referring to himself as his son, and allegedly 
becoming very susceptible to Eldawoody’s jihadist rhetoric. The CHRGJ report alleges 
that Eldawoody was extremely vocal about his anti-American political views, ultimately 
influencing Shahawar by showing him graphic photographs of Abu Ghraib prison abuse, 
Guantanamo, and, most importantly, pictures of young Iraqi girls being raped and 
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tortured, which infuriated Shahawar.109 According to the report Eldawoody told his 
handlers that he now believed it was time to begin recording conversations with 
Shahawar and Elshafay. Elshafay and Shahawar discussed blowing up the Verrazano 
Narrows bridge, and Eldawoody told them that he would relay this plan to a supposed 
terrorist group called “The Brotherhood” located in upstate New York.  
Several months later, Shahawar told Eldawoody that they should plant a bomb in 
the 34th Street subway station in Manhattan late at night so that they could cause 
financial damage without human casualties. Eldawoody recommended nuclear materials 
and informed Shahawar that he could obtain some from the Russian mafia. The report 
indicates that Shahawar grew uneasy but that Eldawoody persisted, prodding him for 
information regarding the existence of video surveillance cameras at the subway station. 
On August 21, 2004, Eldawoody drove Shahawar and Elshafay to the subway station 
where they conducted reconnaissance. Afterwards, they drew up maps, and those maps 
were used against the defendants in the trial. Two days after the surveillance, Eldawoody 
informed Shahawar that The Brotherhood was very happy with the plan and seemed 
eager to get it started. According to the report, Shahawar asked Eldawoody if this 
brotherhood understood that the bombing would be conducted without killing anyone, but 
Eldawoody kept changing the topic of conversation.  
Ultimately, Shahawar refused to be the one to actually place the bomb but agreed 
to act as a lookout. The following describes the exchange that followed between 
Eldawoody and Shahawar as detailed in the report: 
However, he insisted that he would first need his mother’s permission. 
Unsatisfied with this stipulation, Eldawoody threatened to tell “the 
Brotherhood” and said, “If you tell me you don’t feel comfortable, if you 
don’t want to do it, let me tell him straight. . . . You don’t want to do it?” 
Shahawar’s response was, “No, I don’t want to do it.” Eldawoody then 
ratcheted up the pressure: “Okay. Okay. That’s what I’m going to call him 
to let him know, okay? Why didn’t you tell me before?” Shahawar: replied 
“I don’t know I have to do it. I know that I am making a plan. But, you 
know, I don’t know that I’m going to go and do it. And so that fast? No,  
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impossible.” Nonetheless Eldawoody persisted and Shahawar finally 
agreed to be a lookout. This seemed to appease Eldawoody. Before getting 
out of the car, Shahawar apologized.110 
Elshafay apparently corroborated this account as he later testifies that Shahawar 
attempted to back out of the plan. The report then indicates that, following this exchange 
in which Shahawar demonstrated a reluctance to commit, he was asked to come to the 
local police precinct for an unrelated charge, and was placed under arrest for conspiracy 
charges. His defense argued that he was entrapped, but the prosecution focused on 
Shahawar’s predisposition to commit the act which ultimately resulted in a conviction. 
Shahawar’s predisposition was proven largely by the initial conversations he had with 
Pasha, the undercover NYPD officer who had spoken with him in the bookstore. 
Shahawar was subsequently sentenced to 30 years in prison. 
The CHRGJ report details the arrests of Shahawar’s parents, Shahina and Siraj, 
and his sister, Saniya, all of whom were arrested the day after Shahawar’s sentencing on 
immigration related charges. Siraj spent six months in immigration detention, and 
Shanina and Siraj had to rely on others for money; and Shahina had to work at the 
bookstore for income. Similar to the previous two cases, the report describes how the 
family became labeled as terrorists, were ostracized by their community and family, and 
were scared that they were being watched by the government. Like the matrons in the 
previous two cases, Shahina became involved politically: 
Over time, however—and faced with the growing awareness that 
Shahawar’s case is actually part of a larger pattern—Shahina and Saniya 
began to combat their sense of isolation. Through a community 
organization called Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM), both Shahina 
and Saniya have become vocal advocates, both for Shahawar and against 
the government’s use of informants to target Muslims and concoct fake 
terrorist plots.111 
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a. The Criticisms 
The CHRGJ report’s criticisms center substantially on what it presents as 
the overly aggressive role of the informants, particularly Eldawoody, in having to 
persistently induce Shahawar into action. The report characterizes Elshafay as an 
emotionally unstable schizophrenic, and the overall critical claim is that the NYPD 
intentionally targeted weak-minded or mentally susceptible persons for entrapment.  
b. Summary 
In summary, this report attempts to establish the following criticisms of 
terror sting operations in the Shahawar Siraj Matin case. 
• The suspect was selected as a target because of statements induced 
by a police operative in the bookstore 
• Law enforcement targeted gullible and weak-minded individuals 
for the operation 
• The informant was over-zealous and overly involved in creating 
the plot and pressuring the suspect into committing to it 
• The subject was pressured into committing to the plot despite 
repeatedly attempting to back out, and was exploited for his 
sympathy for the photos of the rape victims he was shown  
• No real danger existed to anyone apart from the law enforcement-
contrived plot 
4. Ahmadullah Sais Niazi and Craig Monteilh 
Craig Monteilh, code named “Oracle,” generated considerable controversy when 
he embarked upon a public campaign in 2009 alleging that the FBI paid him hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to spy on the Islamic Center of Irvine in California, as well as 
Muslim homes and businesses in 2006. These allegations followed the arrest of 
Ahmadullah Sais Niazi, a member of the Islamic Center of Irvine. Niazi was accused of 
being a Taliban sympathizer and of attempting to provide material support to Al Qaeda. 
These statements were supported by the existence of a recording that Monteilh claims he 
provided to the FBI.112 According to Montielh, who was known as Farouk Al-Aziz, a 
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Syrian-French individual to those with whom he interacted, and “Oracle” to his FBI 
handler, he was instructed to pretend to be a convert to Islam and a jihadist. 
In his role, Monteilh spent a significant amount of time in Southern California 
mosques, speaking out against the American government frequently, and engaging many 
in jihadist rhetoric. According to Montielh, he took his instructions seriously, speaking 
out so often and so aggressively that the leadership of the mosque became alarmed by his 
jihadist rhetoric and ultimately filed a restraining order against him and also reported him 
to the FBI.113 Monteilh further claimed that his FBI handler told him that Islam 
constituted a threat to national security and that he was ordered to randomly surveil 
Muslims to draw out potential terrorists.114 He further claimed he was instructed to sleep 
with Muslim women and to collect personal identifying information, such as e-mail 
addresses and cellular telephone numbers for inclusion into an FBI database for 
monitoring mosque attendees.115 Monteilh recorded conversations with a hidden 
microphone in his vehicle key fob, and mosque members reported that he frequently 
seemed to forget his keys everywhere.116 Montielh went on to file a lawsuit against the 
FBI in January 2007 after he was arrested on a grand larceny charge. In his suit, he 
claimed, among other things, that the FBI allowed his status as an informant to leak, and 
that he was stabbed in prison as a result.117 Testimony and court records confirmed that 
Monteilh was a paid informant for the FBI and that he earned $177,000 in 15 months.118 
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Shakeel Syed, director of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, which 
is described as an umbrella group for 75 mosques, stated during an interview that the 
Islamic community felt betrayed by the FBI’s infiltration in the Montielh case.119 CAIR, 
in conjunction with the California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), filed suit against the FBI on February 22, 2011, following the Montielh case, 
and described the Bureau’s actions as “indiscriminate surveillance” based upon the 
religion of the subjects.120 Both CAIR and a group called The American Muslim Task 
Force on Civil Rights and Elections called on the American Muslim population to cease 
community relations with the American government in response to the Monteilh case.121 
As of this writing, the lawsuit brought against the FBI by CAIR and the Islamic Shura 
Council of Southern California was dismissed by a federal judge who cited national 
security concerns in exposing the amount of federal records necessary to properly 
conduct the trial. The ACLU and CAIR announced that they would appeal the decision.  
a. The Criticisms 
The problems associated with the Monteilh case are exacerbated by the 
fact that Niazi was subsequently cleared on all charges, and all the potential benefits of 
investing informants and agency resources in a counter-terrorism operation were lost due 
in no small part to the poorly handled deployment of an FBI informant. The damage to 
Muslim community and law enforcement relations resultant from this case is 
immeasurable, and this case potentially represents the most problematic of cases 
reviewed.  
b. Summary 
In summary, the criticisms of this operation are as follows. 
• The target of the operation was perceived to be the entire Muslim 
community 
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• The conduct of the informant in this case lends credibility to the 
notion that the investigations are not directed at specific 
individuals, lack leads, and targets seem to be selected because of 
their religion 
• Informant conduct is largely unregulated and informants are either 
allowed to improvise substantially or are allegedly acting on 
disturbing instructions from their handlers 
• The case ultimately may not have served any purpose since all 
charges on Niazi were dropped, and no other arrests were made 
despite the length and great cost of the investigation 
C. THE PROBLEMS 
The authors of literature reviewed for this chapter persistently repeat certain 
criticisms in each of the cases presented as examples of problematic cases. While legally 
defensible, these particular aspects of each of the cases reviewed seemed to generate the 
most amount of criticism. The following bullets represent some of the core criticisms 
extracted and synthesized from the cases reviewed. 
• Targets Without Leads: Law enforcement agencies are allegedly 
monitoring Muslim locations without evidence, leads, or legal justification 
in some instances. The tactics utilized may lend credence to the perception 
that Muslim places of worship are being indiscriminately targeted by law 
enforcement. The informants represented themselves as Muslims and 
allegedly exclusively focused on Muslims. 
• Informants are Overly Instrumental or Aggressive: Informants are 
described as unscrupulous individuals who cross the line from merely 
affording suspects opportunities to commit a crime to encouraging them 
actively to commit the acts despite their objections. Ideas about Jihad and 
violent ideology are frequently introduced by informants, and the suspects 
are overly encouraged by informants. Government informants themselves 
picked the targets of the plots or encouraged them in certain cases. 
Informant conduct is widely perceived as amounting to entrapment and as 
being part of an intentional campaign by law enforcement to target the 
Muslim community. In certain cases, informants themselves provided all 
the material evidence that would serve as fuel for the conviction of the 
subjects.  
• Suspects are Exploited: Young adults who allegedly have no common 
sense, or are mentally deficient individuals who have no capability or 
intention of committing terrorist acts on their own, are allegedly targeted 
and convinced because of their gullibility or vulnerability. Law 
enforcement allegedly exploited the vulnerabilities of the subjects—
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poverty, naivety, desperation, etc. In much of the cases, no previous 
evidence suggested that the subjects of the operations were dangerous 
prior to the involvement of informants. 
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Persistent themes of criticism remain, which have not varied much since this 
research began. Allegations of indiscriminate targeting, profiling, entrapping, inciting, 
exploiting, and otherwise focusing on the Muslim community, abound throughout the 
literature; and this clash between law enforcement and the Muslim culture is obviously 
the byproduct of what American law enforcement has been tasked with in the post-9/11 
era. Radical Islamists attacked America on 9/11, and although 15 of the 19 hijackers were 
Saudi, significant support for terrorism against Americans and western culture in general 
does occur in certain areas of the Muslim world. It bears repeating, however, that the vast 
majority of Muslims in the United States and abroad do not support terrorism.122 While 
the roots of anti-American sentiment and terrorism in general are complex and related in 
varying degrees to international relationships, foreign policy, and situational dynamics, 
American law enforcement agencies can certainly improve upon some areas if the goal is 
to uphold the dignity of the Muslim community while addressing the presence of violent 
radical ideologues in its midst.  
Informant conduct is at the center of the debate concerning terror sting operations, 
and it is obvious from the literature that in many instances, informants are given 
significant freedom to improvise, as are law enforcement informant handlers, 
independent of the agencies’ directives. It is also clear from the literature that an 
enormous amount of money is invested in these operations that sometimes span several 
years. It is therefore in the best interests of law enforcement agencies to ensure that the 
operations are conducted legally, efficiently, in complete accordance with agency 
regulations, and ultimately, in a manner that will not eventually result in a determination 
by a legislative body that the operations were unconstitutional. Currently, some terror 
sting cases may not meet this standard, and working towards perfecting these operations 
so as to avoid alienating the entire Muslim community is a goal that will serve to improve 
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law enforcement efforts and not undermine them. Negative press and increasing political 
momentum may eventually undo or, at minimum, undermine much of the excellent work 
done by law enforcement agencies in each of these cases; therefore, legitimate criticisms 
must be taken seriously and addressed where possible.  
B. THE PROBLEMS 
Most of the criticisms of terror sting operations are centered on the intelligence 
gathering stage and the behavior of civilian informants in these investigations. Critics 
allege that law enforcement agents are indiscriminately spying on Muslim houses of 
worship and institutions to the point that Muslims in mosques everywhere feel as if 
everything they are doing is being monitored by law enforcement, and some have stopped 
attending as a result.123 Informants are accused of overly aggressive recruiting and 
deception, and of ultimately targeting the young or naïve, the despondent, and 
impressionable individuals who would not, according to critics, have committed the acts 
they are accused of without aggressive coercing by the government. 
Informant use throughout the country is not standardized, and varies even from 
field office to field office and agent to agent despite the fact that organizations like the 
FBI do have general guidelines governing their use. Informant participation varies greatly 
with some offering up information merely because they want to help and others having to 
be paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for their roles.124  
Effectively, to change the perception that the Muslim community has of terror 
sting operations, it is necessary to attempt to address the problems as identified in 
Chapter III, subdivision C. 
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• Targets Without Leads: Law enforcement agencies are allegedly 
monitoring Muslim institutions without evidence, leads, or legal 
justification in some instances. The tactics utilized may lend credence to 
the perception that Muslim places of worship are being indiscriminately 
targeted by law enforcement. The informants represented themselves as 
Muslims and allegedly exclusively focused on Muslims. 
• Informants are Overly Instrumental or Aggressive: Informants are 
described as unscrupulous individuals who cross the line from merely 
affording suspects opportunities to commit a crime to actively 
encouraging them to commit the acts despite their objections. Ideas about 
Jihad and violent ideology are frequently introduced by informants, and 
the suspects are overly encouraged by informants. Government informants 
themselves picked the targets of the plots or encouraged them in certain 
cases. Informant conduct is widely perceived as amounting to entrapment 
and as being part of an intentional campaign by law enforcement to target 
the Muslim community. In certain cases, informants themselves provided 
all the material evidence that would serve as fuel for the conviction of the 
subjects.  
• Suspects are Exploited: Young adults who allegedly have no common 
sense, or are mentally deficient individuals who have no capability or 
intention of committing terrorist acts on their own, are allegedly targeted 
and convinced because of their gullibility or vulnerability. Law 
enforcement allegedly exploited the vulnerabilities of the subjects—
poverty, naivety, desperation, etc. In much of the cases, no previous 
evidence suggested that the subjects of the operations were dangerous 
prior to the involvement of informants. 
C. THE RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Recommendation #1—Stringent Pre-Operational Review Process 
In addressing the first problem, law enforcement agencies including the NYPD 
have reaffirmed that in each of the cases, it always had legitimate reasons, and met all 
legal requirements to investigate individuals at targeted locations. However, as delineated 
early on in this thesis, some contend that lists of locations and individuals were 
eventually deemed to be unfounded in some circumstances; thereby, diminishing the 
justifications for police monitoring at the locations.  
What would help to prevent this situation in the future would be training and/or 
alterations in agency policy that would introduce a more stringent review process before 
undercover officers or informants are sent into the locations to ensure that target locations 
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have met agency-defined criteria. Of course, agencies like the FBI and NYPD are very 
good at what they do and are undoubtedly already very methodical in target selection, 
etc.; however, an additional level of review at the executive-level to ensure that the target 
locations meet the requirements would further increase the quality of active cases.  
Another important component of countering this perception is community 
outreach. During meetings with Muslim communities, they should be reassured that their 
houses of worship and places of business are not randomly selected and are not 
indiscriminately monitored. A persistent, targeted public campaign is crucial to 
establishing and maintaining the credibility and sincerity of law enforcement’s efforts to 
work with the Muslim community. The Muslim community must be consistently 
reassured of the fact that it is not being watched or spied upon because of its religion, 
which is best achieved by empowering the Muslim community to cooperate with law 
enforcement agencies by establishing and maintaining a relationship beneficial to both 
parties. The Muslim community has repeatedly established that its members are both 
willing and able to assist law enforcement in the apprehension of terrorists. It is therefore 
crucial to law enforcement’s counter-terrorism mission to facilitate this level of 
cooperation by keeping channels of communication and cooperation open.  
For the first part of this recommendation to be effective, it must be implemented 
and monitored by decision makers who must be actively involved in target selection. The 
case must be thought through from beginning to end with one of the goals being to 
provide a clear picture of why the location, individuals, or organizations were selected 
and exactly how complicit they were in creating the standard of proof necessary for the 
agency to commit to the operation. This level of quality control requires significant 
forethought and planning and must be a core component of the overall operation if the 
intention of the law enforcement agency is truly to win the cooperation of the Muslim 
community, to dispel the notion that it is being monitored and watched because of its 
religion or race, and ultimately, to protect the investment that agencies have made in 
terms of resources and time since, as seen in the Craig Monteilh case, failures are 
expensive, embarrassing, and harmful to community relations.  
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2. Recommendation #2—Informant Training and Monitoring 
Out of all of the criticisms, the second may be the most valid, at least as far as the 
relative freedom that informants enjoy to improvise. Informants typically receive 
minimal training and are handled by investigators who may hold relatively low rank 
within law enforcement agencies. When informants are to be utilized in sensitive 
locations including houses of worship, they should be made to understand a core set of 
guidelines. This education should be imparted upon them through training sessions in 
which prohibited behaviors are clearly explained. Violations of the training could result 
in the credibility of the operation suffering, and therefore, such behavior must result in 
real consequences against the informant, such as loss of pay when applicable. It is of 
utmost importance that the informant clearly understand prohibited behaviors and that the 
strategy the informant is instructed to adopt is as clearly defined as possible. This 
particular recommendation requires that executives tasked with overseeing the field 
offices and units handling the investigation implement measures and follow up 
procedures that leave no room for error.  
Independent quality assurance divisions must also audit and review informant 
behavior and investigator compliance in each case to keep investigators accountable to 
agency guidelines. 
Again, this policy should be widely adopted by the law enforcement agency and 
should be part of a clearly communicated strategy to the Muslim community in a manner 
that assures it that the efforts of law enforcement to root out extremists from its midst are 
legitimate, legal, and ethical. This assurance should be self-evident in the quality of work 
produced by well-trained informants, as well as the general reduction in the incidence of 
informant misconduct. 
Some have stressed the benefits of using undercover officers instead of civilian 
informants since the officers possess extensive training and are familiar with agency 
guidelines. Undercover officers are less likely to over-incentivize or engage in behavior 
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that could be construed as entrapment.125 While this argument holds merit, the use of 
undercover officers in place of civilian informants would greatly limit the intelligence 
flow in certain investigations, particularly in instances when a civilian informant 
possesses connections crucial to the success of the operations. Therefore, it may follow 
that when infiltrating a religiously, politically, or otherwise sensitive location, the use of 
an undercover officer instead of a civilian informant may be prudent if it can be achieved 
without detriment to the investigation. 
3. Recommendation #3—Executive Review of Defendant Profiles 
The third criticism that posits that subjects of terror sting operations have been 
exploited because of their level of intelligence, etc., may be the weakest since any of the 
most deadly of terrorists, including several of the 19 hijackers in the 9/11 attack, could 
have been accurately characterized as dim-witted. However, means of ensuring that cases 
do not unnecessarily give the impression to the public that individuals were selected 
because of their mental capacity, naivety, or youth are in existence. In cases in which 
suspects fit that description, extra care should be taken to ensure that the cases contain 
abundant and clear evidence so that even the harshest critics would have a difficult time 
questioning the operation. This process should be facilitated by an executive review 
process in which cases are closely scrutinized for potential weaknesses before the final 
execution of the plot, and would benefit law enforcement agencies as well since 
considerable resources and time are invested into these operations. Such safeguards 
would serve as quality control measures that would ultimately facilitate a successful 
prosecution of the defendant(s). Again, this policy would be clearly delineated to the 
Muslim communities as further evidence of a department’s good faith effort to ensure 
that abuses do not happen. 
The purpose of this research is not to criticize the current work of law 
enforcement agencies in terror sting operations that have undoubtedly weakened terrorist 
groups’ recruitment efforts and saved lives; but rather to increase further the effectiveness 
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of the tools available to law enforcement by adding to them a valuable ally in the fight 
against terrorism. The Muslim community has helped stop terrorist attacks nearly two 
dozen times since 9/11 according to one source,126 and at least one in five of all terrorism 
investigations begin with a tip from the Muslim community.127 The law enforcement 
community has a responsibility to use all available resources in this endeavor. The next 
recommendation flows naturally from this sentiment.  
4. Recommendation #4 –Local Community Outreach  
Actively enlisting the participation and assistance of the Muslim community in 
fighting terrorism will help foster an atmosphere of mutual trust and progress. This 
recommendation is one that has already been implemented in Muslim communities 
throughout the nation but bears mentioning due to its importance. Law enforcement 
agencies must have serious community outreach programs, particularly in communities 
the most difficult or the most likely to be influenced by radical ideologies.  
A good example of one agency that polices such a community is the St. Paul 
Police Department (SPPD) in Minnesota. Saint Paul has a significant Somali population, 
approximately 25,000 Somalis or one-third of the nation’s Somali population according 
to one estimate.128 Al Shabaab, a Somali youth terrorist organization with ties to Al 
Qaeda, has successfully recruited young Muslim men in Saint Paul in the past who have 
gone on to commit acts of terrorism abroad.129 The Saint Paul Police Department has a 
significant interest in taking proactive actions to prevent radicalization, and it has done so 
with its federally funded African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach Program  
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(AIMCOP) program. In his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security in July of 2011, SPPD Chief of Police Thomas E. 
Smith briefly described its history. 
In 2009, the Saint Paul Police Department applied for a Bureau of Justice 
Assistance grant to fund AIMCOP. The grant sought to capitalize on 
existing department outreach efforts with the local Somali American 
community, and cited a specific need - the need to prevent further 
radicalization of our youth by al-Shabaab. It further cited specific 
strategies to combat this trend—targeted and ongoing outreach with our 
Somali American community, and coordinated work with partners such as 
the FBI Minneapolis Field Office, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Minnesota, the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office and several 
service providers including the local YWCA, the Saint Paul Intervention 
Project and the Muslim American Society. We were awarded the grant in 
2009 and AIMCOP was launched.130 
Chief Smith continued to describe the enormous successes of the program that 
included the active population of over 300 Somali youth in the police department’s 
athletic league program, which was run by SPPD officers, and the invaluable 
relationships that have been forged with Somali elders and clergy. The chief also 
delineated several examples of the Somali community volunteering information and 
working closely with the SPPD in key counterterrorism cases. He closed by describing in 
detail the significant advantages to officers on patrol who know Somali elders and youth 
and are able to resolve problems quickly because of their relationships with community 
members who they know.131 
The New York City Police Department’s Community Affairs program reinforces 
community-police relations with each precinct nominating up to five different clergy 
liaisons from the community.132 Every NYPD police precinct has a community affairs 
office with officers dedicated to act as liaisons with community members to maintain 
effective partnerships with the community. The 2003 partnership with the NYPD and the 
Vera Institute of Justice served to strengthen the bond between the police department and 
                                                 
130 Committee on Homeland Security, “Hearing on Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization 
Within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland.” 
131 Ibid. 
132 NYPD, “Community Affairs, Special Outreach Program and Services.” 
 75 
the members of the Muslim community. During this initiative, Arab-American, Muslim, 
and South Asian community leaders met with police department representatives during 
separate forums in which different topics of interest to the communities were discussed. 
Detailed records of concerns and responses were kept, follow-up sessions were held, and 
the results were analyzed. What emerged out of the analysis was a realization that 
mutually beneficial relationships had formed during the process that helped to create 
strong bonds, and ultimately, helped the department to make significant inroads into the 
Muslim community.133  
The NYPD Community Affairs Bureau also created the “NYPD UNITED” soccer 
league for Muslim youth and the NYPD Cricket league. Over 400 Muslim and South 
Asian youth participate, and the games have been covered by major news networks and 
continue to grow in popularity.134 In addition, the NYPD’s Clergy Liaison program 
appoints a Muslim Imam as a department chaplain, where he serves as a strong bind 
between the Muslim community and the NYPD. The NYPD also holds an annual Pre-
Ramadan conference at which department executives from all over the city interact with 
Muslim clergy and local leaders. During these meetings, the Muslim community is kept 
abreast of information of importance to them during its sacred holiday, and they can 
express its concerns to department executives. 
An undeniable value in obtaining the assistance of Muslim community members 
is present, in that, not only do law enforcement agencies reap the rewards of intelligence 
and cooperation, but they are also reducing the appeal of the ideology of radical Islamists 
who seek to capitalize on the mistrust that many in the Muslim community may have 
towards American government agencies. When Muslim children are playing on local 
police cricket teams, it may become less appealing to listen to someone insisting on 
fighting against the officers that are having a positive influence on their loved ones. 
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5. Recommendation# 5—Community Affairs Executive Review 
Since the goal of these recommendations is to ensure that counter-terrorism 
operations do not unnecessarily damage the relationship between the Muslim community 
and law enforcement, the community affairs component of the law enforcement agency 
must have some involvement in the overall enforcement strategy. Obviously, these 
operations are clandestine in nature, and it is therefore counterintuitive to allow any 
outside departments or units to be privy to the details of ongoing operations; however, an 
upper level decision maker should be included as part of the review team prior to the 
execution of the critical phases of these operations. This executive should have thorough 
knowledge of the intricacies of the community involved, and may be able to inform on 
second- and third-order effects of the operation and subsequent press attention. Involving 
an executive from the community outreach portion of the agency in the operation could 
help make the difference between the incident being viewed as an attack on the 
community or as the result of collaboration between the community and law 
enforcement. The agency could even decide to prepare key community members in 
advance of an impending public announcement, and afford that member some sort of role 
in the rehabilitation of the delicate relationship between the community and law 
enforcement once the details of the infiltration are made public. Obviously, the 
recommendation is not to allow community leaders to gain access to restricted 
information, but rather to utilize them to assist with any potential community unrest or 
concerns. This is offered merely as a crude example of one possible way that a 
community relations executive might be able to help the agency maintain its goal of 
improving Muslim support for counter-terrorism operations. 
6. Recommendation# 6—Simpler Guidelines and Effective Quality 
Control 
Observed earlier was that FBI investigators were not, by and large, following 
agency guidelines regarding the proper handling and processing of confidential 
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informants.135 These guidelines need to be reviewed, improved where necessary, and the 
key components of informant handling must be simplified. Previously seen was the fact 
that many agents were cheating on the DIOG exam, and while they are responsible for 
their misconduct, it is also an agency failure. It is an indication that the DIOG is difficult 
to understand, that the Bureau has failed to prepare investigators properly for the exam, 
and that it has failed to conduct effective oversight in the certification process. Therefore, 
a clearer and simpler set of informant guidelines that investigators can follow and an 
effective system of oversight to ensure that the quality controls of the exam are not being 
circumvented must be implemented. Ultimately, informant guidelines must be followed if 
the FBI is to succeed in having full control over the manner in which informants are 
handled. If simplifying the guidelines is not possible, flow charts or other simplifications 
should be produced for investigators to ensure that all handlers are following agency 
guidelines. An agency as large and as capable as the FBI is undoubtedly able to institute 
effective measures to ensure that guidelines are followed. The problem is therefore not 
the capability of the Bureau, but rather the lack of importance it has placed on this 
particular issue—an issue increasingly gaining significant political momentum and could 
arguably result in the hampering of law enforcement’s ability to remain proactive in 
fighting terrorism. 
A regular introspective review process must be instituted at the field office level 
to establish the means by which to judge the level of compliance with confidential 
informant guidelines. This self-inspection must be regularly reviewed by the overhead 
internal affairs division or another unit that must also conduct its own inspection of 
confidential informant guideline compliance. The fact that these guidelines exist and 
were largely not being followed is indicative of the disconnect between what the FBI 
should be doing with these cases and what it is doing. Again, the FBI is an elite law 
enforcement agency whose agents regularly save American lives through dedication, 
professionalism, and hard work. This research paper in no way seeks to diminish the 
quality of work that the FBI does every day; however, every agency must seek to 
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constantly improve upon the level of service it provides, and is an area that needs 
improvement and should be a priority if the Bureau is sincerely seeking to have more 
control over the outcome of these cases when informants are involved. Other agencies 
conducting counter-terrorism operations and utilizing informants must also take similar 
action to ensure that the handling of informants is always done in accordance with agency 
guidelines. 
7. Synopsis 
Common throughout each of the preceding recommendations was a substantial 
focus on executive-level decision-making involvement, quality assurance auditing, and 
community outreach. The success of any agency in implementing change will ultimately 
hinge on the agency’s commitment to seeing the change through to completion and 
consistently evaluating its effectiveness. The issues dividing the Muslim and law 
enforcement communities are substantial—as are the consequences. Agency leaders must 
ensure that the mission of the organization persists throughout all levels, and that the 
effects of the procedures translate into a quantifiable reduction in the incidence of less-
than-optimal operations. While the ultimate goal of counterterrorism operations is to save 
lives, law enforcement agencies should realize the benefits of maintaining a close 
relationship with the communities affected by ensuring that good-faith efforts are being 
made to facilitate the strengthening of community relations through an effective 
campaign designed to address the problems identified. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION  
1. What Is at Stake 
The ideology behind radicalization and terrorism in general has undeniable sway 
in the Muslim world. It is tied directly to Islam because terrorists use the religion to pit 
Muslims against the western world through loosely interpreted but rigidly applied tenets 
in the religion. By tapping into their allegiance to God, terrorists know that they have a 




Some posit, however, that terrorists’ success in fully tapping into that allegiance has been 
seriously hampered in the United States by the general prosperity, happiness, and 
legitimacy that Muslims enjoy in this country.136 
The research in this thesis reveals that powerful ways of combating radicalization 
exist, and the methods are surprisingly inexpensive and effective. By analyzing the 
intricacies of radicalization and how and why it occurs, it is possible to understand fully 
how to counter its effects and hopefully defeat terrorism by winning the war of 
ideologies. Patterns emerge within populations that are particularly susceptible to 
radicalism that include poverty, unemployment, alienation, lack of integration into 
society, distrust of government, and unresolved grievances and injustices with legitimate 
channels of political redress absent. The continued degradation of Muslim-police 
relations detracts from these political options, which give the ideology of terror a greater 
chance of success in the Muslim world. By choosing not to address the growing 
complaints in the Muslim community in America directly, it may actually be possible to 
facilitate the growth and sway of radical anti-American ideology among American 
Muslims. Law enforcement, therefore, has a lot to gain by implementing sincere policies 
designed to ensure that a wedge is driven between the Muslim community and terrorists, 
and not between the Muslim community and the local or federal government. This 
struggle of ideologies is important and is recognized as such throughout most of the 
research documents reviewed on the subject of Muslim community relations.  
Muslims, by and large, begin their lives in America more prosperous and less 
exposed to some of the more negative aspects of living in other countries. Government 
corruption, poverty, and unemployment are generally not the widespread epidemics they 
are in other countries, which is evident in the American Muslim community, particularly 
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money, are more skilled, have more of a say in their political future, and become citizens 
more easily.137 Not surprisingly, American Muslims are less likely to radicalize than their 
counterparts in Europe.138 
In terms of understanding the radicalization process, certain conclusions can be 
drawn based upon this nation’s overall understanding of social dynamics and upon 
careful consideration of commonalities that emerge out of the research. An example of a 
common theme of considerable importance is the increased tendency of Muslim 
communities to be more susceptible to radicalization as a result of their inability to 
integrate fully into the countries in which they reside.139 Some place considerable 
importance on this phenomenon, as one writer in particular refers to the failure of 
Muslims to integrate as, “... a main cause of homegrown radicalization….”140 This 
inability to integrate into the host society combines with other factors that may give 
legitimacy and power to those advocating a radical, violent ideology, particularly when 
the problems with integration combine with discrimination, abuse, or other forms of 
neglect by the dominant group in the host country. Those forms of neglect may simply 
consist of the lack of a system of redress for concerns or grievances that the community 
has. Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman describe the phenomenon as follows. 
Adding to the tensions between groups is the fact that members of a 
persecuted group are likely to be alienated from those societal institutions 
seen as controlled by the larger and/or more powerful group. Such 
alienation may be actively imposed by the larger and/or more powerful 
group in the form of exclusionary practices, but may exist even in the 
absence of such practices. […] In the absence of dialogic opportunities to 
reduce threats and redress grievances, aggressive alternatives, including 
terrorism, may become perceived as the only alternatives available.141 
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According to social identity theory, individuals who have established a life for 
themselves and their families in this country, and have personal assets or wealth, feel as 
though they have a stake in the country’s future and will generally not want to jeopardize 
what they have by committing illegal acts of violence.142 In this environment of relative 
prosperity, the radical Islamist’s message loses much of its power. Conversely, Muslims 
who feel isolated, disconnected from society, hopeless, angry, and believe that their 
problems stem from the country they inhabit, will generally find the radical Islamist’s 
message more appealing. This belief is true particularly for Muslim youth who are more 
susceptible to the radical message, and are intentionally targeted for indoctrination by 
terrorist groups for that very reason.143  
What is lacking in this nation, therefore, is a systematic, standardized counter 
radicalization policy. Admittedly, such a policy is extremely difficult to implement as 
many in the U.K. have learned since the implementation of their PREVENT strategy, 
which is a component of their CONTEST strategy established in 2006 in response the 
July 7, 2005 bombings of London transportation systems. The strategy was aimed at 
countering the effects of radicalization, but has been viewed as a dismal failure due to 
what is perceived to be an insincere approach by the Muslim community that views the 
strategy as a means of facilitating government spying into its institutions. The Minister of 
State for Security, Baroness Pauline Neville Jones, conceded in her 2011 keynote address 
at a Washington, DC counter-radicalization conference, that PREVENT has alienated 
many in the Muslim community and has become too broadly utilized by the British 
government, which reversed progress and contributed to a general distrust of the 
government by the Muslim community.144 Interestingly enough, during the same 
conference, the Baroness acknowledged that the U.S.’s American dream concept creates 
a shared sense of identity between Muslims and others living in the United States. This 
sense of shared identity, she continues, is what the U.K. must aspire to achieve. In 
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recognition of the shortcomings of the current PREVENT program, the Baroness 
proposes a revised version in which the three I’s of Ideology, Institutions, and Individuals 
are added. The three I’s focus on those individuals and institutions who espouse the 
ideology of Islamist extremism, and the individuals vulnerable to radicalization because 
of it.  
While the merits of a national counter radicalization policy are debatable, the 
benefits of implementing simple checks and balances into law enforcement’s counter-
terrorism efforts in Muslim circles are undeniable. Much of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts 
are directed specifically at the Muslim community in the United States. Therefore, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that there will be sociological effects that must be directly 
addressed.  
Simple executive-level oversight into the use and training of informants, the 
avoidance of entrapment or the perception of such, the quality control of criminal cases 
involving terror sting operations, and a general good-faith public campaign involving the 
Muslim community, may prove to be powerful methods of combating radicalization and 
terrorist sympathizing in the United States. Measuring the success of these methods could 
prove problematic as it is difficult to quantify the general discontent of a specific 
community. However, what was plainly obvious in 2012 was that, throughout the nation, 
Muslim communities were speaking out and demonstrating against law enforcement 
tactics including the use of informants and terror sting operations. Many valuable ties 
with the Muslim community were negatively affected. A Wall Street Journal article 
highlights some of the accusations of the Muslim community against the NYPD, which 
has been at the forefront of the use of terror sting operations along with the FBI. 
Sheikh Reda Shata was among those singled out for surveillance because 
of his “threat potential” and what the NYPD considered links to 
organizations associated with terrorism, despite having never been 
charged with any crime […] During his time at the Islamic Center of Bay 
Ridge since 2002, he welcomed FBI agents to his mosque to speak to 
Muslims, invited NYPD officers for breakfast and threw parties for 
officers who were leaving the precinct. As police secretly watched Shata 
in 2006, he had breakfast and dinner with Bloomberg at Gracie Mansion 
and was invited to meet with Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Shata 
recalls.[…] The dichotomy between simultaneously being partner and 
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suspect is common among some of New York’s Muslims. Some of the 
same mosques that city leaders visited to hail their strong alliances with 
the Muslim community have also been placed under NYPD surveillance 
— in some cases infiltrated by undercover police officers and confidential 
informants. In April, more than 100 area imams publicly supported a rally 
to “oppose wars, condemn terrorism and fight Islamophobia.” Of those, 
more than 30 were either identified by name or work in mosques included 
in the NYPD’s listing of suspicious people and places in 2006.145 
Therefore, while quantifying the level of trust in the Muslim community or the 
strength of police/Muslim relations in general in cities like New York is difficult, the 
existence of these accusations should be justification enough to provoke a police 
response, and it has. Law enforcement agencies have released public statements 
attempting to assure the Muslim community that it is not being indiscriminately spied 
upon or unfairly entrapped. However, a real change in policy, particularly within the FBI, 
which seems to operate inconsistently throughout its field offices and has not been 
successful at following its own informant regulations,146 would serve to improve the 
quality and consistency of terror sting cases, and help to elicit the support of the Muslim 
community.  
2. Risks/Payoffs 
The greatest danger in altering the manner in which terror sting operations or 
informant operations in general are conducted is that overly limiting the investigator may 
hinder the ability to conduct them successfully in some instances. This situation must be 
avoided as the aim of restructuring these operations is not to limit investigators, but rather 
to limit the incidence of embarrassing or damaging informant misconduct and/or weak 
criminal cases. A responsible and comprehensive overview of the process of conducting 
terror sting operations, and the general use of informants in general, must be conducted in 
a manner that identifies real shortcomings that can be addressed without overly impacting 
the effectiveness of the operation itself.  
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For instance, in one of the most controversial cases, a government informant, 
Craig Monteilh, testified that he was instructed to produce results at all costs and 
admitted to utilizing unethical methods, to ultimately unsuccessfully, infiltrate a 
California Mosque and target extremists present. Although the FBI ultimately triumphed 
by convincing the judge that continued exposure of government documents would 
compromise national security, community relations with law enforcement throughout that 
region of California were potentially irreparably damaged. Unfortunately, and somewhat 
predictably, the Mosque and others in the area aligned with a group that has been accused 
of having ties to terrorism (CAIR) and have begun a public campaign to discredit the FBI 
and its counter-terrorism programs. In this instance, perhaps carefully controlled handling 
of the informant including training on what behavior to avoid and perhaps the recording 
of all sessions with the informant, for example, would have served to dispel quickly the 
allegations against the FBI if they were in fact unfounded. Perhaps increased upper level 
oversight of the operation would have resulted in the more effective use of the informant 
and would have reduced the possibility of the FBI indirectly engaging in behavior that, at 
minimum, was a waste of financial resources, and at most, was an embarrassingly inept 
attempt at apprehending jihadists. This particular informant was paid over $140,000 
dollars, and this instance certainly merits the careful oversight by bureau executives.  
The ultimate payoff of a successful implementation of these quality control 
measures is the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust with the Muslim community, 
and the overall improvement of law enforcement’s effectiveness and proficiency in 
conducting successful counter-terrorism campaigns based upon airtight criminal court 
cases. Additionally, as trust and cooperation build between law enforcement and the 
Muslim community, the influence of radicals, and ultimately, their ability to recruit 
within Muslim circles will diminish over time. As Muslim communities are empowered 
to fight this destructive ideology that affects their communities everywhere, law 
enforcement will benefit by having increased cooperation in the form of intelligence or in 
the use of the communities facilities or human resources. Ultimately, the Islamist 
extremist needs an audience. That audience is potentially reduced since as seen, Muslim 
populations that are well-integrated, prosperous, invested in the community, and have 
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trust in their government are less likely to experience incidences of violent radicalization 
within, which is particularly true of Muslim populations in the United States.147 
3. Costs 
The recommendations outlined in this thesis have minimal additional costs 
associated with their implementation since they are fundamental recommendations that 
could be implemented with current staffing and should require minimal additional 
resources. The recommendations laid forth in this thesis amount to a more stringent 
review by agency executives, standardized training for informants, a public information 
campaign, and an overall highly interactive community policing relationship with the 
Muslim community to strengthen cooperation and trust.  
Agency executives are already in place and what is required is an overall 
adherence to current FBI informant regulations where present, and the addition of stricter 
regulations regarding targeting of sensitive locations and quality control in criminal cases 
where necessary. Law enforcement agencies can increase their overall community 
outreach in Muslim communities, and little to no additional costs should be incurred.  
4. Timeliness of Implementation 
Changes to agency policy should be drafted by departments tasked with 
developing such policies, and, if made a priority, should be implementable relatively 
quickly. Agency policy should be based upon careful reviews of current policy and 
shortcomings with legal experts and decision-making executives present in focus groups, 
as well as field commanders who can all contribute to maximizing the benefit of such 
changes while minimizing any detrimental effects to investigations. The implementation 
of policy changes should be consistently monitored and amended as necessary by agency 
executives and legal experts; therefore, a successful product could take several months to 
emerge. Training for informants could result in precious time lost in crucial 
investigations; therefore, such training should occur at the beginning of the development 
of law enforcement relationships with informants, typically when informants are 
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registered. Informant training should be based upon shortcomings identified in past cases 
and areas that informants displayed gross negligence. Again, the success of informant 
training should be closely monitored and improved upon where necessary. If taken 
seriously, this theoretically should take no longer than a few weeks or months. Some of 
the behavior informants exhibited could be quickly addressed by fundamental orientation 
into the informant program. Lastly, the community policing portion of the 
recommendations can begin immediately. Muslim leaders must be met with, channels of 
communication should be immediately established where necessary, and good faith 
public relations campaigns should begin immediately.  
The recommendations laid forth in this thesis are fundamental in nature and are 
not expensive or time consuming. They are comprised of training and minor changes in 
policy, with the bulk of the changes concentrating on executive level and agency-wide 
changes in focus.  
5. Evaluating Success 
No agency policy changes can succeed without careful and methodical oversight 
and evaluation by executive-level decision makers. Since the bulk of the problems 
associated with terror sting operations and informants in general concern the perception 
within the Muslim community that it is being targeted, a large part of evaluating the 
success of this effort is a persistent gauging of community relations within the agency. 
Maintaining a bonafide relationship with the Muslim community must be a core priority 
of law enforcement agencies actively engaged in serious investigations within those 
communities. Muslim community leaders must be included in counter-terrorism efforts, 
and agency executives must meet with them regularly to be kept abreast of their 
concerns, as well as their contributions.  
Informant training must be regularly improved upon and evaluated, particularly 
when informants engage in conduct detrimental to the effort, and therefore, represents a 
breakdown in the training process. Allegations of informant misconduct must be taken 
seriously by the agency, and therefore, the incidence of these types of negative indicators  
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can serve as an evaluative tool. If all complaints are logged and investigated, the success 
of the overall campaign within a law enforcement agency can be better gauged because 
useful data will emerge.  
6. Possible Opposition 
It is admittedly idealistic to conclude that the outreach efforts, training, changes in 
agency guidelines, and follow-up would completely eliminate the criticisms against terror 
sting operations. However, the training and outreach described in this thesis are currently 
not being employed and, if utilized, would help to provide redress to the Muslim 
community’s grievances while not negatively impacting upon law enforcement’s counter-
terrorism efforts. Even if conducting these operations becomes more difficult as a result 
of narrowing the manner in which they are conducted, the benefits of a Muslim 
community more actively assisting law enforcement will outweigh the limiting effect of 
these changes on terror sting operations.  
Institutional culture, specifically that of law enforcement, is resistant to change, 
particularly when that change is perceived as a restriction on the tools available to law 
enforcement. Therefore, an essential part of this recommendation involves the careful 
presentation of the problem to law enforcement agents at the receiving end of the new 
policy. They must be made aware of the benefits of having the Muslim community act in 
a supportive capacity, to include all the examples in which tips from its community 
helped stop terrorist attacks in America.148 They must also be made aware of to what 
extent this perception of spying, etc., has damaged the relationship between law 
enforcement and the Muslim community, and how that damage has served to reduce the 
likeliness of encouraging cooperation from the community and may have actually 
strengthened the radical Islamists’ influence in the Muslim community. 
These recommendations are an admittedly broad description of what needs to be a 
complex solution to a complex problem. Lives, court cases, and the welfare of entire 
communities hang in the balance when law enforcement agencies conduct these 
operations that ultimately result in the removal of dangerous radicals from within Muslim 
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communities. Therefore, any perceived restriction on the freedoms or tools of 
investigators can be expected to be met with some opposition. It is crucial, therefore, that 
investigators are formally included in the agency’s policy of community involvement, as 
well as the benefits of enlisting the cooperation of the Muslim community and having a 
more professional informant base. Convictions and guilty pleas will be easier to obtain 
when informants are acting according to their improved training and cases have been 
systematically assembled with clear benchmarks and executive oversight and approval. 
Investigators should expect to see an increased quality in their operations, increased 
participation and intelligence contributions of the Muslim community, an increasingly 
simpler judicial process, and the increasingly positive press as a result of more fine-tuned 
operations. 
7. Agendas 
One final point that needs to be made regarding these recommendations is that the 
incidence of perceived public outrage at these operations may not decline immediately. 
Political groups and social groups that thrive on conflict, and controversies, contrived or 
otherwise, will always be present. What needs to be at the forefront of any law 
enforcement agency dealing with Muslim populations and embarking upon counter-
terrorism efforts is a legitimate strategy to include the Muslim community in helping to 
fight terrorism. Therefore, while negative press may always be part of policing, law 
enforcement must press forward in the knowledge that their methods and motivations are 
rooted in a bonafide effort to protect the innocent from acts of terror and to uphold the 
dignity of all the populations they serve.  
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